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ABSTRACT 
I examine whether political pressure by the government as a response to voters’ general 
interest in protecting employment is reflected in the enforcement actions by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Using labor intensity as a measure for a firm’s contribution to 
employment, I find that labor-intensive firms are less likely to be subject to an SEC 
enforcement action. Next, I show that labor-intensive firms are less likely to face an SEC 
enforcement action in presidential election years if they are located in politically important 
states. I also find evidence of a lower likelihood of SEC enforcement for labor-intensive firms 
that are headquartered in districts of senior congressmen that serve on committees that oversee 
the SEC. All of these results hold after controlling for firms’ accounting quality and two 
alternative explanations for firms’ favorable treatment by the SEC, i.e., firms’ location and 
political contributions. These findings suggest that voters’ interests drive political pressure on 
SEC enforcement—independent of firms’ lobbying for their special interests.  
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1.  Introduction 
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcement actions have been 
subject to increased scrutiny following the SEC’s failure to detect several frauds such as those 
executed by Bernard Madoff and Sir Allen Stanford (see e.g., Henriques, 2009; Waas, 2012). 
A growing literature in accounting examines the reasons for such failure in SEC enforcement 
by investigating the choice of enforcement targets by the SEC. These studies indicate that the 
resource constraints of the SEC, as well as political pressure as a result of firms’ political 
connections or lobbying activities on the SEC, affect the agency’s choice of enforcement 
targets (Correia, 2014; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011; Yu and Yu, 2011). Consistent with the 
latter argument, Correia (2014) and Yu and Yu (2011) show that firms with political 
connections or that engage in lobbying are less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC and face 
lower penalties if prosecuted by the SEC.  
While these studies recognize that the SEC is subject to political pressure, they do not 
consider that the president and Congress (“government”) may also react to voter pressure—
independent of firms’ political connections—according to which they may influence SEC 
enforcement.
1 Yet, economists such as Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) have long 
emphasized that the government responds to both voter  and  special interest pressure by 
adjusting its political decisions accordingly to maximize political support. Given that 
employment conditions are proven to systematically affect future electoral outcomes (Hibbs, 
2006; Kau et al., 1982; MacRae, 1977; Wolfers, 2002), the government has promoted these 
conditions by supporting not only large employers in absolute terms, but also smaller, labor-
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper I use the term “government” when I refer to both the executive, i.e., the president, as well 
as the legislative, i.e., Congress, branches of the federal government.  3 
 
intensive firms that contribute to future employment (Adams and Brock, 1987a; Audretsch, 
2003; Caves, 1976).  
The SEC’s enforcement actions might significantly interfere with the government’s goal 
of promoting employment. In particular, sanctions directed by the SEC in combination with 
negative market reactions result in huge reputational and financial costs for both the firm and 
manager, and can ultimately lead to bankruptcy of the convicted firm (Feroz et al., 1991; 
Karpoff et al., 2008a, b).
2 As job losses can be a direct consequence of bankruptcy, SEC 
enforcement actions not only affect the economic wealth of a firm’s shareholders, but also that 
of a firm’s employees as well as the overall employment conditions. In fact, the SEC (2006) 
has acknowledged that its enforcement actions and the fines associated with these actions 
might actually be counterproductive to its mission of protecting investors as they impose an 
additional burden on firms as well as innocent third parties that already face huge costs from 
the fraudulent activities.
3  
Following this line of argumentation, I investigate whether political pressure by the 
government as a response to voters’ interests for employment is likely to be reflected in the 
SEC’s decisions as to which firms to investigate. In particular, I use firms’ labor intensity as a 
proxy to identify firms that contribute to the employment conditions and investigate whether 
the SEC reduces its enforcement actions for labor-intensive firms.
4   
The regulation models developed by Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), and Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) provide theoretical support that regulations and regulators are influenced by 
politicians. In the case of the SEC, Congress decides on the allocations of resources to the 
                                                 
2 For instance, Karpoff et al. (2007, 2008b) show that about 34 percent of the firms that are subject to an SEC 
enforcement action file bankruptcy.   
3 Paul S. Atkins and Cynthia A. Glassman, two former SEC Commissioners, have emphasized that businesses 
could have used the money they spent on fines to hire more workers (Harkness and Siegel, 2006; Johnson, 2006). 
4 Several prior studies in the accounting literature (e.g., Hilary, 2006; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010) use a 
firm’s labor intensity to measure a firm’s level of employment relative to its size.  4 
SEC, while the president appoints SEC commissioners with the advice and consent of the 
Senate (SEC, 2013a; Weingast, 1984). Therefore, the government can influence the SEC 
through its congressional committees that are involved in setting the SEC’s budget or 
overseeing the agency as well as through the presidential appointments of the SEC 
commissioners (Weingast, 1984; Weingast and Moran, 1983).  
To test whether the SEC reduces its enforcement actions for labor-intensive firms, I use a 
sample of firms, for the time period 1982 to 2012, that have been sanctioned by the SEC for 
violating Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as reported in Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and all other public firms that did not receive an 
AAER over this period. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find evidence that labor-intensive 
firms are less likely to be subject to an AAER. This result holds after controlling for a firm’s 
size, performance, accounting quality, location, political contributions, the government’s 
partisanship, union membership per industry, and other monitors such as analysts following. 
This finding is consistent with my hypothesis that voters’ interests drive political pressure on 
SEC enforcement.  
This finding, however, might be driven by latent firm characteristics of labor-intensive 
firms that might, for instance, have a higher firm quality in general, and a higher accounting 
quality in particular. To rule out this alternative explanation and to test more directly how 
political pressure from the government affects SEC enforcement, I further examine whether 
variations in government’s sensitivity to voters’ interests and power over the SEC result in 
variations of SEC enforcement actions against labor-intensive firms.  
To investigate whether variations in government’s sensitivity to voters’ interests reflect in 
SEC enforcement, I examine SEC enforcement behavior during presidential election years.  
Prior research in political economy especially highlights the role of upcoming elections as a 
period in which the government is likely to take measures to ensure political support in the 5 
 
upcoming election (Brown and Dinc, 2005; Kramer, 1971; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 
2010). I argue that this increased sensitivity to voters’ interests during election years results in 
more political pressure on the SEC, leading to even fewer enforcement actions against labor-
intensive firms. I find that the lower likelihood of SEC enforcement actions against labor-
intensive firms is more pronounced in presidential election years and is concentrated in 
politically important states, i.e., closely contested states with high Electoral College counts.  
To investigate whether variations in the power of Congress on the SEC reflect in SEC 
enforcement, I examine the impact of individual congressmen who sit on committees that 
oversee the SEC. Prior studies have documented that the ability of congressmen to influence 
SEC enforcement is likely to be higher for senior congressmen who serve on committees that 
set the budget, appoint the SEC’s commissioners, and oversee the SEC (Correia, 2014; Ritt, 
1976; Roberts, 1990; Weingast, 1984). I find evidence that the lower likelihood of SEC 
enforcement for labor-intensive firms is more pronounced if the firm is headquartered in a 
district of a senior congressman who serves on a committee that oversees the SEC.
5  
Alternatively, a potentially higher accounting quality of labor-intensive firms might also 
explain lower SEC enforcement. Even though I include a firm’s F-score (Dechow et al., 2011) 
as a control variable in all of my earlier tests to control for a firm’s accounting quality, I run 
several additional tests to investigate whether labor-intensive firms have a better accounting 
quality and thus fewer SEC enforcement actions.
6 In particular, I use all three specifications of 
the F-score as developed by Dechow et al. (2011), discretionary accruals based on the 
modified Jones model as in Dechow et al. (2011) and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, 
and the incidence of accounting restatements as proxies for a firm’s accounting quality. I find 
                                                 
5 In this study a senior congressman with the ability to influence SEC enforcement is a congressman who has 
served at least for one complete term on the Appropriations, Banking or Commerce committees.  
6 The F-score developed by Dechow et al. (2011) is a scaled probability that can be used as a red flag or signal of 
the likelihood of earnings management or misstatement. Dechow et al. (2011) developed the F-score by 
systematically investigating financial characteristics of firms that have been subject to an AAER. 6 
consistent evidence across all proxies that labor-intensive firms have a lower accounting 
quality than their less labor-intensive peers. This finding suggests that fewer SEC enforcement 
actions against labor-intensive firms cannot be explained by these firms having a higher 
accounting quality.  
Furthermore, I run several sensitivity tests to address potential concerns of my research 
design. First, to address the concern that my measure of labor intensity reflects a firm’s total 
labor intensity instead of a firm’s U.S. labor intensity, I obtain data on firms’ U.S. and non-
U.S. labor intensity from Compustat Segments and examine whether both U.S. and non-U.S. 
labor intensity are associated with a lower likelihood of SEC enforcement. As reporting the 
number of employees per geographical region is not required under SFAS 131, the 
information is only available for a small subset of my original sample. For this small subset, I 
find that only a firm’s U.S. labor intensity is associated with a lower likelihood of SEC 
enforcement, providing additional evidence that labor intensity is likely to proxy for 
government preferences instead of some underlying risk of engaging in fraudulent accounting 
choices. Second, I apply propensity score matching for a subset of my sample to better 
address the differences in the distribution of firm characteristics such as firm size between 
labor-intensive and less labor-intensive firms. By matching labor-intensive observations with 
non-labor-intensive observations that have insignificant propensity-score differences along a 
comprehensive set of firm characteristics, I can investigate whether labor-intensive firms are 
indeed less likely to be subject to SEC enforcement holding all identifiable firm 
characteristics constant. My results are largely robust to this alternative research design.  
Finally, I investigate whether labor-intensive firms are less likely to receive a comment 
letter from the SEC. As comment letters are a potential trigger event for an SEC enforcement 
action, examining whether labor-intensive firms are less likely to receive such letters can 
provide indications at which stage of the SEC enforcement process the SEC adjusts its 7 
 
enforcement actions in accordance with the government’s preference for employment. I find 
that labor-intensive firms are less likely to receive a comment letter, suggesting that the SEC 
allocates fewer resources to reviews of labor-intensive firms, which might lead to fewer 
enforcement actions against these firms.  
This paper contributes to the accounting literature in the following ways. First, my study 
enhances our understanding on how regulatory agencies in general and the SEC in particular 
choose their enforcement targets. While the SEC is the central agency that is responsible for 
enforcing accounting regulation to secure the functioning of capital markets, not much is 
known about how this agency selects its enforcement targets. My study contributes by 
demonstrating that SEC enforcement is influenced by political pressure. Second, in contrast to 
studies that have focused on firms’ attempts to impact SEC and other regulators’ enforcement 
via lobbying and political connections (Correia, 2014; Gordon and Hafer, 2005; Hunter and 
Nelson, 1995; Yu and Yu, 2011), the findings of my study suggest that, in addition to such 
lobbying for firms’ special interests, the government also imposes pressure on the SEC to 
ensure that this agency promotes voters’ interests via fostering employment. Thus, my study 
also contributes by highlighting that political pressure to promote voters’ interests affects SEC 
enforcement, which emphasizes the importance to consider political pressure as a response to 
both voter and special interest pressure. Finally, my study contributes to prior research in 
economics and political economy that documents governments’ willingness to engage in 
costly activities to enhance employment conditions. While prior studies show that 
governments induce pressure on state-owned firms to engage in excess employment (Alesina 
et al., 2000; Borjas, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) or bail out firms that are perceived as 
too big to fail (Adams and Brock, 1987a, b), my study sheds light on an additional measure 
the government potentially applies to foster employment, i.e., reduced SEC enforcement for 
labor-intensive firms. These results should be of interest to policy makers, regulatory agencies 8 
such as the SEC, and firms subject to regulatory oversight by the SEC. Going forward, future 
research could investigate whether and how the government’s preference for employment 
reflects in other regulatory agencies within and beyond the U.S.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior research on 
political pressure on governmental agencies and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents 
the data and research method. Section 4 provides the empirical results and additional 
sensitivity tests. Section 5 concludes. 
1.  Hypothesis Development 
1.1.  Consequences of SEC enforcement and government preferences for labor-intensive 
firms 
The SEC enforces accounting regulation which has a pivotal role in securing the 
functioning and fairness of the capital markets (SEC, 2013b). Its enforcement actions, 
however, can have significant adverse impacts on the affected firms and the associated 
stakeholders of these firms. Karpoff et al. (2008b), for instance, find that, in addition to the 
direct penalties, the SEC’s enforcement actions can lead to huge reputational penalties 
imposed by the market.
7 As a result, about 34 percent of the firms do not survive the 
enforcement process and thus file bankruptcy.
8 On the other hand, firms that survive face a 
mean dollar loss of $591.75 million from the SEC enforcement action (Karpoff et al., 2008b).  
Such potentially severe consequences might incentivize firms to try to influence SEC 
enforcement to minimize the probability and size of the wealth transfer generated by its 
                                                 
7 In particular, the reputational penalties, i.e., the expected losses in the present value of future cash ﬂows due to 
lower sales and higher contracting and ﬁnancing costs, are over 7.5 times the sum of all penalties imposed 
through the legal and regulatory system (Karpoff et al. 2008b). 
8 Karpoff et al. (2007) find that in their sample of enforcement actions over 70 percent of the firms that filed 
bankruptcy did so during the period of the enforcement action, but only a minority did so during the violation 
period or in the period between the violation and the enforcement action. Thus, while these findings do not rule 
out that firms that are subject to an SEC enforcement action might already have been on the verge of bankruptcy, 
they suggest that such action might trigger a firm’s bankruptcy or accelerate the process that leads to a firm’s 
bankruptcy.   9 
 
enforcement actions (Correia, 2014; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). In fact, a considerable 
stream of literature has—based on the general exchange relationships between groups of 
individuals and politicians described in regulation models developed by Stigler (1971), 
Peltzman (1976), and Grossman and Helpman (1994)—focused on the pressure politicians 
pose on regulatory agencies such as the SEC due to firms’ political connections. The general 
argumentation in these studies is that firms can establish valuable political connections via 
lobbying expenditures or other political contributions as politicians can use these 
contributions to increase their political support. In line with this argumentation, studies find 
that politically connected firms are less likely to be involved in enforcement actions from 
regulatory agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service (Hunter and Nelson, 1995), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (Mixon Jr, 1995) and the SEC (Correia, 2014; Yu and Yu, 
2011).  
While this stream of literature recognizes that the government imposes pressure on 
regulatory agencies such as the SEC due to firms’ political connections, i.e., to protect special 
interests, it has not considered that the government might also have preferences independent 
of firms’ active attempts according to which it may influence SEC enforcement. In fact, the 
regulation models of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) argue that politicians in general and 
the government in particular seek to maximize political support, which comes in the form of 
votes, and thus ensure that their actions also promote voters’ interests independent of special 
interests. In line with this theory, a pervasive body of research has since shown that the 
government indeed represents its voters’ interests to increase political support (Hibbs, 2006; 
Kalt and Zupan, 1984; Mian et al., 2010; Peltzman, 1984, 1985, 1992; Potrafke, 2012). Hibbs 
(2006) and MacRae (1977) argue that voters’ support is to a large degree influenced by 
economic variables such as employment, inflation, or the growth rate of private consumption. 
In fact, empirical studies show that employment conditions significantly influence voters 10 
when deciding whether to re-appoint an incumbent government and, as a consequence, 
employment has been a core interest of governments (Bertrand et al., 2007; Conover et al., 
1986, 1987; Hibbs, 2006; Holbrook, 1991; Kau et al., 1982; MacKuen et al., 1992; MacRae, 
1977; Wolfers, 2002). For instance, Holbrook (1991), who investigates presidential election 
outcomes for the years 1960 to 1984, finds that for every percentage point of unemployment, 
the president’s party loses 1.2 percent of the vote.  
As the employment conditions significantly affect future electoral outcomes, the 
government has the incentive to foster employment conditions in order to ensure political 
support (Caves, 1976). Indeed, a huge body of research indicates that governments, 
independent of their partisanship (Nordhaus, 1975; Potrafke, 2012), promote employment. For 
instance, governments of both partisanships established policies to promote small businesses 
as these businesses are often more labor-intensive than larger firms (Brock and Evans, 1989) 
and are perceived to have the ability to generate jobs (Audretsch, 2003; Davis et al., 1996). In 
particular, small businesses have been supported by government programs such as the Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in the early 1980s in order to contribute to the 
employment conditions.
9 More recently, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act or JOBS 
Act, which is also intended to support small U.S. businesses by reducing various securities 
regulations for these firms, has been passed (Congress, 2012; VanRoekel, 2012). In addition, 
the government also promotes employment by supporting specific firms that contribute 
significantly to the overall employment conditions. In particular, firms that are perceived as 
being too big to fail receive government support in various forms such as import protection, 
regulatory delays, and subsidies in the form of tax favors and bailouts (Adams and Brock, 
1986, 1987a, b, 2004). Chrysler, for instance, has been bailed out by the government to 
                                                 
9 The SBIR was an offshoot of the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program, which provided more 
than $3 billion to young firms between 1958 and 1969 (Audretsch, 2003). 11 
 
prevent huge job losses and destabilization of the entire manufacturing sector at the end of the 
1970s and 2000s (Adams and Brock, 1987a; Barnes, 2009).  
Overall, the government has long promoted employment conditions to protect voters’ 
interest by supporting not only large employers in absolute terms, but also smaller businesses 
that employ a large number of people in relative terms and contribute to future employment. 
As a consequence, the government has preferences not just for large firms but also for smaller, 
labor-intensive firms as they contribute to the overall employment conditions (Adams and 
Brock, 1986, 1987a, b, 2004; Audretsch, 2003; Caves, 1976; Hillman et al., 1987). As job 
losses are a direct consequence of bankruptcy, bankruptcy of labor-intensive firms will result 
in relatively more job losses than bankruptcy of firms that are less labor-intensive. 
Consequently, the government has incentives to protect labor-intensive firms from events 
such as failure or bankruptcy that can interfere with the government’s goal of promoting 
employment to protect voters’ interests.   
1.2.  SEC behavior under government preferences 
As outlined above, SEC enforcement can have severe effects on the affected firms. Since 
the government seeks to promote employment conditions to maximize political support, it is 
likely to impose pressure on the SEC whose enforcement actions, whether or not they result in 
a firm’s bankruptcy, can significantly interfere with the government’s goal to promote 
employment.  
The literature on the political control of regulatory agencies highlights several 
mechanisms through which the legislative as well as executive branches of federal 
government, i.e., the Congress and the president, can influence that their preferences are likely 
to reflect in the SEC’s decisions as to which firms to investigate. The SEC, as a regulatory 
agency, is dependent on Congress’s budget decisions (Weingast, 1984). According to 
Weingast (1984) these budget decisions can be used to reward (or punish) agency decisions 12 
that increase (or decrease) political support. Next to Congress’s control over the SEC’s 
budget, both branches of the government have several additional instruments at their disposal 
that can potentially create incentives for regulators to act in accordance with the government’s 
goal to maximize political support. First, the president with the advice and consent of the 
Senate appoints SEC Commissioners and can thus impact which political views are 
represented in the SEC (Noll, 1971; SEC, 2013a; Weingast, 1984). Second, both branches of 
government can sanction the SEC and its employees. SEC Commissioners and other key 
employees often have political careers and their careers also depend on their political support 
from the incumbent government (Alesina and Tabellini, 2007). Finally, as described by Arthur 
Levitt, former Chairman of the SEC (Levitt and Dwyer, 2003), congressmen, as well as 
members of the presidential administration, can actively intervene with an SEC investigation. 
As a result, the SEC is likely to act in accordance with government’s preference to foster 
employment and thus might have to exercise judgment as to which firms to investigate.  
This judgment can potentially occur at several steps of the SEC investigation process, 
which consists of several distinct stages and can ultimately lead to an AAER.
10 The 
investigation process typically starts with a firm’s conspicuous announcement, called trigger 
event, which can lead to an informal and confidential investigation by the SEC. If 
questionable activity is suspected, a formal investigation is initiated after which the 
Commission decides how the investigation proceeds. The process ends with an enforcement 
action such as an AAER.
11 An SEC that is likely to adjust its enforcement actions in 
accordance with government’s preference to foster employment has several possibilities to 
exercise judgment as to which firms to investigate during this process. For instance, the 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed description of the SEC enforcement process see Karpoff et al. (2008b) and Kedia and 
Rajgopal (2011). 
11 During the investigation period, the targeted ﬁrm may issue a press release indicating that it is the target of an 
SEC informal inquiry or formal investigation. However, usually the firm does not voluntarily disclose this 
information (Karpoff et al., 2008b; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). 13 
 
Commission contributes to the definition of enforcement priorities, which constrain the staff’s 
resource allocation choices in the initial stage (Correia, 2014). As a consequence, the SEC 
might allocate fewer resources to general reviews or informal and confidential investigations 
of labor-intensive firms.
12 Such a behavior of the SEC potentially reduces the likelihood that 
the SEC detects misbehavior of labor-intensive firms. If the SEC starts a formal investigation 
of a labor-intensive firm, the SEC Commissioners, as they decide how the investigation 
proceeds, can still overrule the recommendation of the SEC staff and thus reduce or even 
prevent enforcement actions against these firms.  
In summary, the government has both the incentive and the means to impact the SEC 
enforcement process. Therefore, I argue that the government’s preference for labor-intensive 
firms reflects in lower likelihood of SEC enforcement actions against these firms. This 
argumentation can be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Labor-intensive firms are less likely to be subject to an AAER. 
1.3.  Variations in government’s sensitivity and power  
Hypothesis 1 states that government’s preference for labor-intensive firms results in a 
reduction of SEC enforcement for these firms. However, this finding might be driven by latent 
firm characteristics of labor-intensive firms that might, for instance, have a higher firm quality 
in general, and a higher accounting quality in particular. Government’s sensitivity towards its 
voters as well as its power over the SEC are likely to vary over time and can thus be used to 
form different cross-sectional predictions on the probability of enforcement for labor-
intensive firms, which can provide more robust evidence for hypothesis 1.  
                                                 
12 General reviews of company filings are conducted by the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance and may 
result in a comment letter if the Division believes that disclosure can be improved. According to Robert Sack, the 
former Chief Accountant of the Enforcement Division, these reviews are an important trigger event of an 
enforcement action as the SEC obtains about 50% of the leads from these reviews (Feroz et al., 1991). 14 
Prior research in political economy especially highlights the role of upcoming elections  
as a period in which the government is likely to respond even more to the needs of its voters 
to ensure political support in the upcoming election (Brown and Dinc, 2005; Hibbing and 
Alford, 1981; Kramer, 1971). As Kinder and Kiewiet (1979, 1981) have emphasized, voters 
often use the current health of the economy as a signal of the incumbent’s economic 
competence that will influence the voter’s economic prosperity in the future. Therefore, it is 
of particular importance for the government to foster employment conditions prior to 
elections. In line with that argument, a large literature on political business cycles, starting 
with Nordhaus (1975), has highlighted that the incumbent government is indeed willing to 
engage in potentially costly activities prior to elections to enhance the current employment 
conditions or avoid negative news with regard to these conditions. For instance, Alesina et al. 
(2000), Borjas (1986), and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show that the government prior to 
elections can induce pressure on state-owned firms to engage in excess employment and pay 
above-market wages in order to gain greater political support. Furthermore, studies by Cole 
(2009) and Dinç (2005) provide evidence that prior to elections the government provides 
subsidies via government-owned banks to the private sector as an additional mechanism to 
improve employment.  
Next to inducing pressure on government-owned firms, studies have also shown that the 
government induces pressure on regulators to reduce politically costly regulatory actions 
before elections. For instance, Hunter and Nelson (1995) and Young et al. (2001) document 
lower audit rates by the IRS in states that are important for the presidential election.  
Therefore, both political economy theory and empirical evidence indicate that the 
government in general and the presidential administration in particular is likely to place more 
pressure on regulators prior to elections. Based on this, I argue that the SEC also faces more 
political pressure from the government prior to elections. This increased pressure, 15 
 
consequently, leads to relatively fewer enforcement actions against labor-intensive firms prior 
to elections. Thus, I state the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2a: Labor-intensive firms are relatively less likely to be subject to an AAER 
in presidential election years. 
Such increased political pressure on the SEC in election years is, however, not necessarily 
constant across states. In fact, prior research has argued and found that during presidential 
elections the political pressure is directed to electoral-vote rich states that are tightly contested 
to enhance the presidential reelection prospects (or those of the president’s party) (Grier et al., 
1995; McCarty, 2000; Young et al., 2001). For instance, Grier et al. (1995) find that the 
president’s decision to veto a bill can be predicted by the votes of senators from electorally 
important states. Young et al. (2001) find that the fraction of individual income tax returns 
audited is lower in districts that are important to the president electorally. Mebane and Wawro 
(1993) also show that the president specifically targets spending toward areas that are 
important for his reelection. These results suggest that the presidential administration may use 
the veto and other perquisites of the office to favor some states over others. Based on this 
argumentation, I argue that in presidential election years the SEC faces more political pressure 
to spare labor-intensive firms located in politically important states, i.e., electoral-vote rich 
states that are tightly contested. Thus, I state the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2b: In presidential election years, labor-intensive firms are relatively less 
likely to be subject to an AAER if they are located in politically important states. 
In contrast to the president, members of the House as well as one third of the members of 
the Senate have to contest in elections every two years, potentially resulting in a constant 
attempt of congressmen to act in the interest of their voters. With respect to the SEC, the 16 
ability of congressmen to put pressure on the SEC is likely to vary (Correia, 2014; Weingast, 
1984). In particular, politicians who serve on committees that set the budget, appoint the 
SEC’s commissioners, and oversee the SEC should have a higher ability to affect the agency’s 
activities (Weingast, 1984). Prior research has identified the Appropriations, Banking or 
Commerce committee as committees that are mainly responsible for overseeing the SEC (e.g., 
Correia, 2014; Weingast, 1984).
13 The politicians’ ability to affect the SEC should also 
increase with their seniority within committees (Grier and Munger, 1991; Ritt, 1976; Roberts, 
1990). Therefore, I argue that labor-intensive firms located in districts of senior congressmen 
who serve on committees with the highest control over the SEC are less likely to be subject to 
an AAER. Thus, I state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2c: Labor-intensive firms are relatively less likely to be subject to an AAER 
when they are located in districts of senior congressmen who serve on committees with 
the highest control over the SEC. 
2.  Data and Research Method   
2.1.  SEC enforcement data 
To investigate SEC enforcement I use a sample of firms that have been subject to 
enforcement actions by the SEC for allegedly misstating their financial statements as reported 
in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Using the SEC’s AAERs as a 
sample of misstatement ﬁrms has several advantages relative to other potential samples. First, 
the use of AAERs as a proxy for manipulation is a straightforward and consistent 
methodology. This methodology avoids potential biases induced in samples based on 
                                                 
13 During the time period of my sample about 95% of all states had at least one of a state’s two senators serving 
on one of these three committees. Due to this lack of variation in the Senate I focus on the members of the House 
of Representatives. 17 
 
researchers’ individual classiﬁcation schemes and can be easily replicated by other researchers 
(Dechow et al., 2011). Second, in contrast to the Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) 
Financial Statement Restatement Database, AAERs span a larger time period, state the 
reporting periods that were misstated, and are likely to only include events that occurred as a 
consequence of intentional misstatements rather than misinterpreting accounting rules 
(Dechow et al., 2011; Plumlee and Yohn, 2010). Finally, using the SEC’s AAERs also allows 
me to use the F-score, which is a potentially powerful proxy for a firm’s accounting quality in 
this specific setting, as the F-score has been developed to predict AAERs (Dechow et al., 
2011). Despite the advantages of using AAERs to identify accounting misstatements, there is 
one main disadvantage, which is common to many studies that also consider additional 
enforcement actions (e.g., Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). In particular, AAERs as well as other 
enforcement actions represent the end product of investigations as opposed to the initial 
investigations themselves. To test whether the government’s preferences impact the SEC’s 
enforcement actions, I would ideally like to study all investigations undertaken by the SEC. 
However, data on informal investigations that did not eventually convert into formal 
enforcement actions are not publicly available (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). As a consequence, 
I cannot investigate at which stages of the enforcement process the government’s preferences 
for firms that contribute to employment actually affect this very process.
14   
I obtain the data on AAERs from Dechow et al. (2011). All enforcement actions that 
involve an accountant or an auditor are designated as an Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release (AAER) by the SEC, which is my measure of the SEC’s enforcement 
actions. The SEC has issued AAERs during or at the conclusion of an investigation since 
                                                 
14 As a sensitivity test, I use the SEC’s comment letters, which might result from a general SEC review, and 
investigate whether labor-intensive firms are less likely to receive such comment letters. As these letters might 
trigger an enforcement action, investigating the likelihood of receiving these letters provides some insights at 
which stage of the SEC investigation process the SEC adjusts its enforcement actions in accordance with the 
government’s goal to foster employment. 18 
1982. Therefore, the dataset I use in this study spans the time period 1982 to 2012, and 
consists of 3,403 AAERs; resulting in 1,297 firm misstatement events. After excluding 
AAERs that are unrelated to earnings misstatements or occur in financial industries, i.e., two-
digit SIC codes 60-69, and matching the remaining misstatement events to firms’ publicly 
available data in Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), I have a 
remaining sample of 694 firm-year observations with available data, representing AAERs 
against 306 distinct firms. Including my large sample of control firms, i.e., all non-AAER 
firms with available data for the same time period, I arrive at an overall sample of 93,207 
firm-year observations, representing 11,400 distinct firms.  
2.2.  Methodology  
To test whether labor-intensive firms are indeed less likely to receive an AAER, I 
examine the likelihood of receiving an AAER using the following logistic regression model 
where subscript i represents the firm and t the year: 
AAER	Dummy    	β   β  Labor	Intensity    	 β Control	Variables  
 
 	e  					 1 	
The  AAER DUMMY is an indicator variable that is equal to one in the years the 
misstatements occurred as reported in the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, 
and zero otherwise (Dechow et al., 2011).  
To test my first hypothesis, I use firms’ labor intensity to proxy for a firm’s contribution 
to employment. In line with prior research (e.g., Hilary, 2006; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 
2010), I measure LABOR INTENSITY as the ratio of the firm’s total employees (Compustat 
item: EMP) scaled by current year’s total average assets.
15 If labor represents a relatively large 
proportion of the factors of production, i.e., labor relative to capital, the firm employs 
                                                 
15 Average total assets equals the sum of beginning and end of year total assets, i.e., (Compustat item: AT), 
divided by two.  19 
 
relatively more employees and therefore, I argue, is less likely to be subject to SEC 
enforcement actions. As the level of labor intensity varies across industries, I adjust this 
measure by subtracting the two-digit SIC code median-industry labor intensity to arrive at my 
final measure of a firm’s LABOR INTENSITY.
16 The higher this share, the more labor-
intensive a firm is relative to other firms in its industry. Thus, a firm with higher LABOR 
INTENSITY contributes more to the government’s preference for employment. H1 predicts a 
negative coefficient on β1, i.e., higher labor intensity will be associated with a lower 
likelihood of receiving an AAER. 
To test hypothesis 2a, whether labor-intensive firms are indeed even less likely to be 
subject to an AAER in election years, I adjust the logistic regression model for testing H1 in 
the following way: 
AAER	Dummy  
 	β   β  Labor	Intensity    	β Election	Year   	β Labor	Intensity  
∗E l e c t i o n 	 Y e a r  	 	 β Control	Variables  
 
 	e  																		 2 	
ELECTION YEAR is a dummy variable that is one in all presidential election years during 
the time period 1982-2012 (i.e., 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012), and 
zero otherwise. As presidential elections coincide with Congressional elections, these years 
represent higher scrutiny of voters towards their government. Thus, I use these years as my 
proxy for government’s sensitivity towards voters’ interests prior to elections. I interact this 
indicator variable with my firm-specific measure of LABOR INTENSITY. The underlying 
argument of H2a is that the government is willing to increase its pressure on the SEC to 
enhance the current employment conditions or avoid negative news with regard to these 
                                                 
16 I rerun my models without adjusting these measures by industry-medians and with adjusting these measures by 
the four-digit SIC code median-industry labor intensity (see Table 3). My results are unaffected by applying 
these alternative measures.  20 
conditions as voters often use the current health of the economy as a signal of the 
government’s competence to foster future employment. Thus, for the government, the point in 
time the market first learns about the start of an SEC investigation against labor-intensive 
firms, instead of the release of an AAER, which lags the initial revelation of the misconduct 
by on average over 1,000 days (Karpoff et al., 2008b), is important. To the extent that this 
point in time cannot be controlled by the SEC as such investigations can be revealed by the 
media, other stakeholders or even the firm itself, the SEC is likely to reduce the enforcement 
actions against labor-intensive firms. Thus, I use the same dependent variable as for testing 
H1, denoted AAER DUMMY, which is one in the year the misstatement has occurred, instead 
of the year when the AAER has been released. H2a predicts a negative coefficient on β3, i.e., 
labor intensity has a greater impact on lowering the likelihood of being subject to an AAER in 
an election year compared to a non-election year. 
To test hypothesis 2b, whether in election years labor-intensive firms are less likely to be 
subject to an AAER if they are located in politically important states, I adjust the logistic 
regression model for testing H2a in the following way: 
AAER	Dummy  
 	β   β  Labor	Intensity    	β Election	Year   	β Important	State 
 	β Labor	Intensity   ∗E l e c t i o n 	 Y e a r  	 	β Labor	Intensity  
∗I m p o r t a n t 	 S t a t e  	 	β Election	Year  ∗ Important	State 
 	β Labor	Intensity   ∗E l e c t i o n 	 Y e a r   ∗ Important	State 
 	 β Control	Variables  
 
 	e  																																																																		 3  
In line with prior research that argues and finds that presidential campaign resource 
allocations are concentrated in closely-contested states with a high Electoral College count 
(Brams and Davis, 1974; Grier et al., 1995), the variable IMPORTANT STATE captures the 
margin of victory as well as the number of Electoral College votes in each state. In particular, 21 
 
I follow the methodology of Cebula et al. (2013) and express the political importance of a 
state by dividing the number of Electoral College votes at stake by the margin of victory for 
the winning candidate. The states are then ranked in descending order for each U.S. 
presidential election (see Appendix A). IMPORTANT STATE is an indicator variable that is 
one for the top ten most important states, and zero otherwise.
17 H2b predicts a negative 
coefficient on β7, i.e., in election years labor-intensive firms are less likely to be subject to an 
AAER if they are located in a politically important state.  
To test hypothesis 2c whether labor-intensive firms are relatively less likely to be subject 
to an AAER when they are located in districts of senior congressmen who serve on 
committees with the highest control over the SEC, I adjust the logistic regression model for 
testing H1 in the following way: 
AAER	Dummy  
 	β    β  Labor	Intensity    	β Senior	Congressman 
 	β Labor	Intensity   ∗ Senior	Congressman 	 	 β Control	Variables  
 
 	e  																																			 4  
SENIOR CONGRESSMAN is an indicator variable that is one if a firm’s headquarters are 
located in a congressional district with a congressman who has served for at least one 
complete term on the Appropriations, Banking or Commerce committee, and zero otherwise. 
These committees are mainly responsible for overseeing the SEC (e.g., Correia, 2014; 
Weingast, 1984). To construct this variable I obtain data from Charles Stewart’s 
Congressional Data webpage for all members of the House for the time period 1982-2012 and 
                                                 
17 For instance, according to that metric Florida and Ohio are in the top ten of the 2008 list. Obama-Biden won 
Florida’s 27 Electoral College votes by a margin of 236,450 popular votes, and Ohio’s 20 Electoral College 
votes went to Obama-Biden by a margin of 262,224 popular votes. California, the most populous state, was near 
the bottom of the 2008 list. California’s 55 Electoral College votes went to Obama-Biden by a margin of about 
3.3 million popular votes (Cebula et al., 2013).  22 
match every firm to a specific district based on its zip code as reported in Compustat.
18 I 
exclude all firms located in states that only have one congressional district (i.e., Alaska, 
Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) to rule out that 
my results are driven by state level effects.
19 H2c predicts a negative coefficient on β3.    
I include several control variables in all of these models. First, firms that engage in less 
aggressive accounting choices are less likely to be subject to an AAER. To control for a firm’s 
accounting quality, I use the F-score developed by Dechow et al. (2011).
20 Dechow et al. 
(2011) investigate ﬁnancial characteristics of misstating ﬁrms and develop a model to predict 
misstatements, i.e., AAERs. The output of this analysis is a scaled probability (F-score) that 
can be used as a red ﬂag or signal of the likelihood of earnings management or misstatement 
(Dechow et al., 2011). In particular, Dechow et al. (2011) develop three different F-scores that 
include (1) only financial statement variables such as accruals, changes in ROA, or changes in 
receivables (F-SCORE 1), (2) financial statement variables and off-balance sheet as well as 
nonfinancial variables such as the existence of operating leases (F-SCORE 2), and (3) 
financial statement variables, off-balance sheet as well as nonfinancial variables and stock 
market-based variables such as market-adjusted stock return (F-SCORE 3). Thus, in different 
specifications of my models I either include F-SCORE 1, F-SCORE 2 or F-SCORE 3. The 
higher the resulting F-score, the higher is the likelihood of earnings misstatement.
21   
                                                 
18 http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html. During the time period of my sample about 95% of all states 
had at least one of a state’s two senators serving on one of these three committees. Due to this lack of variation in 
the Senate I focus on the members of the House of Representatives.  
19 The results are unaffected by including firm-year observations from these states. 
20 It is possible that the F-score does not only capture firm’s accounting quality but also partly the SEC’s 
selection criteria (Dechow et al., 2011). From a ﬁrm’s perspective, however, being subject to an SEC 
enforcement action is very costly (Karpoff et al., 2008b), making it beneficial for firms to avoid these 
characteristics. Therefore, the F-score is likely to mainly capture characteristics of firms that are more likely to 
misstate their financial statements as opposed to the SEC’s selection criteria (Dechow et al., 2011). In 
untabulated tests, I also use discretionary accruals according to the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) discretionary accrual model to control for a firm’s accounting quality. My 
results are not affected by using this alternative measure of a firm’s accounting quality.  
21 For a detailed explanation of the development of the F-score, see Dechow et al. (2011). 23 
 
As Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) show that the SEC is more likely to investigate firms 
located closer to its offices, I also control for the distance between the county of a firm’s 
headquarters and SEC offices in Washington, DC, New York City, NY, Miami, FL, Chicago, 
IL, Denver, CO, and Los Angeles, CA. I follow Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) and estimate the 
distance between the county of a firm’s headquarters and SEC offices using the latitude and 
longitude of both counties and SEC offices obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau Gazetter.
22 
Based on these distances I create a dummy, PROXIMATE 100, which is equal to one for all 
firms that are located within 100 km of the SEC office.  
In addition, several studies find that firms that engage in lobbying or are politically 
connected can enjoy a favorable treatment by the SEC (Correia, 2014; Yu and Yu, 2011). To 
rule out that my results are driven by firms’ active attempts to influence the SEC, I obtain data 
on firms’ Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions from the Federal Election 
Commission’s (FEC) website (www.fec.gov).
23 PAC contributions are widely used as a proxy 
for political connections (see Milyo et al., 2000 for an overview) and the FEC compiles this 
data from 1978 onwards, allowing me to apply this proxy for a firm’s political connections for 
my whole sample period. I match the amount of PAC contributions to my sample of 
Compustat firms and measure political connections by scaling firms’ PAC contributions by 
                                                 
22 In particular, I use the Haversine formula to calculate the distance between counties and SEC offices (Kedia 
and Rajgopal, 2011). In 2007 the SEC elevated its district offices located in Boston, MA, Philadelphia, PA, 
Atlanta, GA, Fort Worth, TX, Salt Lake City, UT, and San Francisco, CA to regional offices and gave them 
responsibilities similar to their existing regional offices (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). In order to increase the 
comparability of my results to those of Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) I consider only a firm’s distance to the 
original regional offices. Considering these additional regional offices does, however, not affect my results.   
23 A PAC is a political committee that is organized to raise money to elect or defeat candidates. It can be 
sponsored by a corporation that can cover the PAC’s operating costs but cannot contribute directly to the PAC. 
Instead, PACs solicit contributions from executives, employees, and shareholders of the firm. The decision to 
distribute PAC contributions typically belongs to the top executives of the firm (Correia, 2014). 24 
total average assets, denoted PAC CONTRIBUTION, to control for a firm’s political 
contributions relative to its size.
24  
I also obtain data from the Union Membership and Coverage Database maintained by 
Hirsch and Macpherson (2003), which allows me to control for the percentage of employees 
who are union members per four-digit SIC code, denoted UNION.
25 To the extent that labor-
intensive firms have a higher percentage of employees who are union members, controlling 
for such membership allows me to rule out that my results are primarily driven by pressure 
from unions instead of government preferences for fostering employment. I also include 
proxies for a firm’s visibility used in prior studies on SEC enforcement (Correia, 2014; Kedia 
and Rajgopal, 2011). In particular, I include the natural logarithm of the number of analysts 
issuing annual earnings forecasts for firms covered by IBES, denoted LOG ANALYST 
FOLLOWING, and an indicator variable, FORTUNE 500, that is one if the firm is covered in 
the Fortune 500 index as reported in Compustat, and zero otherwise.  
In accordance with prior studies that investigate determinants of firms’ misstatements  
(Brazel et al., 2009; Ettredge et al., 2008), I also include several variables that control for the 
characteristics of a firm. First, I include a firm’s two-digit SIC code median-adjusted return on 
assets, denoted ROA, to control for a firm’s performance. Above average ﬁnancial 
performance may indicate that the ﬁrm is achieving abnormally high performance through 
fraudulent reporting, or that the ﬁrm may have incentives to commit fraud in order to sustain 
their performance (Brazel et al., 2009). Next, I construct a dummy variable, denoted BIG 4, 
which is one for all firms audited by a Big 4 firm, and zero otherwise. As Big 4 auditors are 
potentially of higher quality than non-Big 4 auditors (Defond, 1992; Palmrose, 1988), clients 
                                                 
24 I also obtain data on firms’ lobbying expenditures from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) as an 
alternative measure for firms’ political connections (Blau et al., 2013; Correia, 2014; CRP, 2013). As the CRP 
compiles this data only from 1998 onwards, these tests are limited to the period 1998-2012. My results are robust 
to this alternative measure (see Table 3). 
25 This database is publicly available at www.unionstats.com. 25 
 
of the Big 4 might be less likely to commit fraud. Consequently, employing a Big 4 auditor 
may lead to higher audit quality and reduce a ﬁrm’s opportunity to engage in fraud (Brazel et 
al., 2009). 
Furthermore, I use the MARKET-TO-BOOK ratio to control for a firm’s growth 
expectations since Dechow et al. (1996), for instance, find that firms with higher growth 
opportunities are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation. A firm’s LEVERAGE is also 
included to control for a firm’s financial distress (Brazel et al., 2009; Dechow et al., 1996). 
Financially distressed ﬁrms may have a greater incentive to commit fraud than those that are 
not distressed. The natural logarithm of a firm’s age, denoted as LOG FIRM AGE, controls for 
the fact that fraud ﬁrms tend to be younger (Beneish, 1997), which may be due to a greater 
incentive to commit fraud as a result of an initial public offering or other newly issued stock. 
To control for size I include the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, LOG ASSETS. 
Finally, I include fixed effects for the tenure of each SEC Chairman as reported on the SEC 
homepage as well as for the tenure of each U.S. President.
26 Table 1 provides an overview of 
my variables.   
- Table 1 here - 
2.3.  Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of my sample, a comparison between more and less 
labor-intensive firms, and a comparison of the AAER vs. non-AAER firms to better 
understand the differences between these different types of firms.  
As reported in Table 2, Panel A, the mean (median) firm in my sample has total average 
assets of $1,808 million ($141 million), 6,823 (837) employees of which on average 11.5% 
are union members, leverage of .179 (.119), a market-to-book ratio of 2.8 (1.8), and is 15 (10) 
                                                 
26 http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm. 26 
years old. The skewness of these distributions suggests that my sample includes 
proportionately smaller and younger firms. The majority of firms are audited by a Big 4 
auditor (81.4%), 31.3% of the firms are located within 100 km distance to a major SEC office, 
and are followed by 4.5 analysts on average. Furthermore, 27.4% of the firms contributed to 
PACs, spending on average $14,646 per year, and during the time period 1998-2012, 16.2% 
of the firms engage in lobbying, spending on average $71,621. 
Table 2, Panel B reports the differences between more and less labor-intensive firms. I 
split the sample at the median value of labor intensity into two groups. The descriptives 
indicate that more labor-intensive firms are significantly smaller, older, more profitable, have 
less analysts following, employ a larger number of people and have less leverage. Labor-
intensive firms also contribute less to PACs and engage in less lobbying, i.e., a smaller share 
of labor-intensive firms contributes to PACs and the absolute contribution amounts are lower. 
Furthermore, more labor-intensive firms have significantly higher F-scores, a larger share of 
them is located further away from an SEC office and does not have a Big 4 auditor, 
suggesting that labor-intensive firms potentially engage in more aggressive accounting 
choices.  
Table 2, Panel C shows the differences between the firms that received an AAER and 
firms that did not. In particular, the descriptives show that firms that received an AAER differ 
significantly from firms that did not receive an AAER in all variables except for leverage. For 
instance, AAER firms have a higher F-score, are located closer to an SEC office, are more 
profitable, are more likely to be audited by a Big 4 auditor, have more analysts following, 
have higher growth expectations as measured by the market-to-book ratio, are younger and 
larger. This is consistent with the perception that the SEC is more likely to target large firms 
and firms located closer to its offices (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). I also find that a larger 
share of AAER firms contributes to PACs and that the absolute contribution amounts are 27 
 
larger. The descriptives also show that AAER firms employ more people as they are much 
bigger in size and operate in industries with a lower percentage of union members. However, 
AAER firms are significantly less labor-intensive than their non-AAER peers. This finding 
provides preliminary support for H1.  
- Table 2 here - 
3.  Results   
3.1.  Test of H1 
Table 3, Panel A shows the results of estimating equation 1, which examines the 
likelihood of being subject to an AAER. Consistent with H1, the negative and significant 
coefficient on labor intensity (β1) in all of the models indicates that more labor-intensive firms 
are less likely to receive an AAER using industry-adjusted and non-adjusted measures of 
labor intensity. The coefﬁcient estimate is not only statistically signiﬁcant but also points to 
economic signiﬁcance as reported in Table 3, Panel B. In particular, the likelihood of an SEC 
enforcement action for a firm in the bottom quartile of labor intensity in contrast to a firm in 
the top quartile increases by 11%. These results indicate that the SEC is less likely to 
prosecute firms that contribute to the government’s preference of promoting employment. 
This finding is robust to controlling for firms’ PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures, size, 
performance, accounting quality, and distance to an SEC office, among others.   
The control variables are in line with prior research. In particular, the positive and 
significant coefficients on all three types of F-score, i.e., model (1), (2) and (3), indicate that 
firms with a higher F-score are more likely to have misstated their financial statements and 
thus are more likely to receive an AAER (Dechow et al., 2011). I find a positive and 
significant coefficient on the PROXIMATE 100 dummy. Therefore, consistent with Kedia and 
Rajgopal (2011), I show that firms located closer to the SEC’s main offices are more likely to 
be investigated and thus receive an AAER. The positive but insignificant coefficient on PAC 28 
CONRIBUTIONS suggests that political contributions do not reduce the likelihood of being 
subject to an AAER. However, consistent with Correia (2014), firms with higher lobbying 
expenditures relative to their size are less likely to be subject to an AAER, as indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficient on LOBBYING EXP. I also find, in line with prior research 
(Brazel et al., 2009), a negative and significant coefficient on the Big 4 dummy in all models, 
suggesting that clients of the Big 4 are less likely to commit fraud. Finally, I also find that 
larger and younger firms as well as firms with a larger growth potential and more analysts 
following are more likely to be subject to an AAER. 
- Table 3 here - 
3.2.  Test of H2 
Model 1 and 2 in Table 4, Panel A present the results of estimating the probability of 
being subject to an AAER in a presidential election year to test H2a. The results show a 
negative and significant coefficient on β1, i.e., a firm’s labor intensity, and β3, i.e., the 
interaction term between the election year indicator and a firm’s labor intensity, in both 
models. The coefﬁcient estimates are not only statistically significant but also economically 
signiﬁcant, as reported in Table 4, Panel B. In particular, the likelihood of an SEC 
enforcement action for a firm in the bottom quartile of labor intensity in contrast to a firm in 
the top quartile increases by 25% (10%) in an election (non-election) year.
27 These results thus 
indicate that labor-intensive firms are relatively less likely to receive an AAER in a 
presidential election year. As the coefficient on labor intensity stays significant in all models, 
the results suggest that labor-intensive firms enjoy in general a favorable treatment by the 
SEC, and not just in election years. Moreover, the election year indicator is negative and 
                                                 
27 Marginal effects for this interaction term are calculated by holding all variables except for a firm’s labor 
intensity and the election year indicator at their mean (Greene, 2010). 29 
 
significant in all models, suggesting that the SEC engages in less enforcement actions during 
presidential election years.  
Model 3 and 4 of Panel A present the results of estimating the probability of being subject 
to an AAER in a presidential election year in a politically important state to test H2b. The 
results show a negative and significant coefficient on β1, i.e., a firm’s labor intensity, β2, i.e., 
the election year indicator, and β7, i.e., the interaction term between the election year 
indicator, being located in a politically important state and a firm’s labor intensity, in both 
models. However, the interaction between a firm’s labor intensity and the election year 
indicator is not significant anymore. Thus, in line with H2b, I find that the lower likelihood of 
SEC enforcement against labor-intensive firms in presidential election years is concentrated in 
politically important states, suggesting that the political pressure on the SEC is directed to 
electoral-vote rich states that are tightly contested to enhance the presidential reelection 
prospects (or those of the president’s party).  
Table 4, Panel C presents the results of estimating the probability of being subject to an 
AAER if headquartered in a district of a senior congressman who serves on a committee that 
oversees the SEC to test H2c. The results show a negative and significant coefficient on β1, 
i.e., a firm’s labor intensity, and β3, i.e., the interaction term between the senior district 
congressman indicator and a firm’s labor intensity, in both models. The coefficient on the 
senior district congressman indicator is not significant. The coefﬁcient estimates are not only 
statistically significant but also economically signiﬁcant, as reported in Table 4, Panel D. In 
particular, the likelihood of an SEC enforcement action for a firm in the bottom quartile of 
labor intensity in contrast to a firm in the top quartile increases by 29% (8%) if (not) 
headquartered in a district of a senior congressman. In line with H2c, I find that firms 
headquartered in a district of a senior congressman who serves on a committee that oversees 
the SEC are less likely to be subject to SEC enforcement. These findings suggest that senior 30 
congressmen can induce pressure on the SEC to reduce the likelihood that labor-intensive 
firms located in their district are subject to SEC enforcement.  
Overall, these findings provide more robust evidence that SEC enforcement is influenced 
by both branches of federal government and are consistent with H2.    
The results for the control variables remain largely unchanged to the results reported in 
Table 3, Panel A and are thus not discussed in detail. 
- Table 4 here - 
3.3.  Sensitivity tests 
3.3.1.  Accounting quality as alternative explanation for reduced SEC’s enforcement 
actions against labor-intensive firms 
A potential alternative explanation for fewer enforcement actions against labor-intensive 
firms is that these firms have a higher accounting quality than less labor-intensive firms. In 
addition to controlling for firms’ accounting quality in my main models, I therefore run the 
following ordinary least squares regression model and logistic regression model, respectively, 
where subscript i represents the firm and t the year: 
Accounting	Quality    	β   β  Labor	Intensity    	 β Control	Variables  
 
 		e  				 5 	
ACCOUNTING QUALITY is measured using six different proxies. In particular, in three 
of the six models I use the three different types of F-scores as developed by Dechow et al. 
(2011). Recall that the F-score can be used as a red ﬂag or signal of the likelihood of earnings 
management or misstatement (Dechow et al., 2011). In addition, I use two discretionary 
accruals models that have been widely used in prior literature. More specifically, I use the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) discretionary 
accrual model to measure accounting quality. Discretionary accruals are the difference 
between firms’ actual accruals and the normal level of accruals. To determine the 
discretionary accruals, I first estimate the following modified Jones model (1991) cross-31 
 
sectionally as in Dechow et al. (2011) for every two-digit industry-year t with at least ten 
observations per industry-year: 
∆WC   β    β  	 1A     ⁄   	β 
∆S   	∆Rec 
A   
 	β 
∆PPE 
A   
 e  																																							 6 	
where ΔWCt = ΔARt + ΔInventoryt - ΔAPt - ΔTPt + ΔOther Assets (net)t. ARt is accounts 
receivable, APt is accounts payable, TPt is taxes payable. St is sales, Rect accounts receivables, 
At-1 beginning of the year assets, and PPEt is property, plant and equipment. The estimated 
absolute residuals are my proxy for discretionary accruals, denoted MOD. JONES DIS. ACC. 
To determine the discretionary accruals according to Dechow and Dichev (2002), I 
estimate the following ordinary least squares model cross-sectionally for every two-digit 
industry-year t with at least ten observations per industry-year: 
∆WC   β    β  	 1A     ⁄   	β CFO     	β CFO   	β CFO     e  																																		 7 	
where ΔWCt is defined as above and CFO is cash flow from operations. The estimated 
absolute residuals are my proxy for discretionary accruals, denoted DD DIS. ACC.
28   
As a final measure of firms’ accounting quality, I obtain all restatements from the 
Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) Financial Statement Restatement Database, which 
covers the time period 1997-2006. I run the aforementioned model as a logistic regression 
model where ACCOUNTING QUALITY is measured using restatements as an indicator 
variable that is equal to one in the years a restatement has been released by firms. Prior 
research suggests that a substantial number of restatements are due to unintentional errors 
rather than intentional misstatements (Hennes et al., 2008; Plumlee and Yohn, 2010). I include 
both intentional as well as unintentional errors in my sample due to two reasons. First, 
restatements are an important trigger event for SEC enforcement actions (Dechow et al., 2011; 
                                                 
28 To address the possibility that labor-intensive firms are more likely to manage their earnings downward, which 
potentially does not result in the same regulatory scrutiny as upward earnings management, I also use the signed 
residuals from both models as an alternative proxy for discretionary accruals. The results remain unchanged.     32 
Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). As a consequence, firms that do not enjoy preferential treatment 
by the SEC might exercise more care in the preparation of their financial statements making it 
less likely that these firms make unintentional errors as well as intentional misstatements. 
Second, a large number of restatements due to intentional misstatements are initiated by 
regulatory action (Dechow et al., 2011). Thus, firms that enjoy preferential treatment by the 
SEC and thus are likely to face fewer enforcement actions are potentially less likely to be 
required to restate their financials due to intentional misstatements. In accordance with prior 
studies, I control for firm performance, Big 4 auditor, firms’ growth expectations, leverage, 
firm age, and firm size (e.g., Beneish, 1997; Brazel et al., 2009; Dechow et al., 1996). All 
variables are defined as described in Table 1.   
Table 2, Panels A through C provide descriptive statistics on the discretionary accruals 
measures. In particular, Panel B shows that labor-intensive firms have significantly higher 
levels of discretionary accruals, suggesting a lower accounting quality of these firms. More 
evidence in line with this preliminary evidence is presented in Table 5. The coefficient on 
labor intensity is positive and significant in all six models, consistently suggesting that the 
level of labor intensity is negatively associated with a firm’s accounting quality.  
While each of the accounting quality measures has its drawbacks (Dechow et al., 2011; 
Price III et al., 2011), in sum, these findings consistently suggest that labor-intensive firms do 
not have a higher accounting quality, which might explain fewer enforcement actions against 
these firms. Instead, the results consistently suggest that labor-intensive firms exploit their 
preferential treatment by the SEC and engage in more aggressive accounting choices.  
The coefficients on the control variables are similar to prior research. In particular, firms 
audited by a Big 4 auditor and older firms have a higher accounting quality; growth firms a 
lower accounting quality. 
- Table 5 here - 33 
 
3.3.2.  U.S. labor intensity versus non-U.S. labor intensity 
To address the concern that my measure of labor intensity reflects a firm’s total labor 
intensity instead of a firm’s U.S. labor intensity, I obtain data on firms’ U.S. and non-U.S. 
number of employees and total average assets from Compustat Segments. As reporting the 
number of employees per geographical region is not required under SFAS 131 and has only 
been voluntarily reported as of 1999, the information is only available for a relatively small 
subset of my original sample, i.e., 5,018 firm-years representing 1,217 individual firms. The 
descriptive statistics of this subsample (untabulated) indicate that about 90% of the sample 
firms do not have employees and assets outside of the U.S., suggesting that using firms’ 
overall labor intensity is by and large reflective of firms’ U.S. labor intensity. In addition, for 
the subsample of firms that have both U.S. and non-U.S. employees, the correlation between 
U.S. and non-U.S. labor intensity is .43 (p<0.01), between U.S. and total labor intensity is .80 
(p<0.01), and between non-U.S. and total labor intensity is .63 (p<0.01), suggesting that the 
overall measure of labor intensity is reflective of firms’ U.S. employment.  
Finally, the subset of firms with U.S. and non-U.S. labor intensity allows me to further 
substantiate whether my proxy of government’s preferences for employment, i.e., a firm’s 
labor intensity, captures these preferences or is associated with some underlying omitted 
variable. In particular, I rerun model (1) but replace the firm’s total labor intensity by its U.S. 
and non-U.S. labor intensity. As the government wants to foster U.S. employment in response 
to voters’ pressure instead of non-U.S. employment and thus has preferences for firms with a 
higher U.S. labor intensity, I expect a negative and significant coefficient on U.S. labor 
intensity but a non-significant coefficient on the non-U.S. labor intensity.   
The results of this test are shown in Table 6. The coefficient on U.S. labor intensity but 
not on non-U.S. labor intensity is negative and significant suggesting that a firm’s U.S. labor 
intensity influences regulatory actions by the SEC instead of non-U.S. labor intensity.  34 
Overall, the results of this additional test indicate that a majority of firms seem to mainly 
employ people in the U.S. and that regulatory preferences seem to be related to U.S. labor 
intensity. Thus, these results suggest that the bias introduced by using a firm’s total labor 
intensity in my main tests is likely to work against me finding results for my hypotheses and 
also provide some additional evidence that labor intensity measures government preferences 
instead of a latent firm characteristic related to a firm’s accounting quality, for instance. 
However, given that firms that voluntarily report their number of employees in different 
geographic areas might not be representative of the overall sample, these results should be 
interpreted with caution.    
- Table 6 here - 
 
3.3.3.  Propensity Score Matching 
As an additional test of my two hypotheses, I apply a research design that better addresses 
the differences in the distribution of firm characteristics such as firm size between labor-
intensive and less labor-intensive firms. To better address these differences, I employ a 
propensity-score matched pair research design to match labor-intensive observations with 
non-labor-intensive observations that are similar along a comprehensive set of firm 
characteristics (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum, 2010).  
In particular, I estimate a probit propensity-score model, which is the probability that a 
firm will be in the top decile of labor intensity (i.e., the treatment) conditional on observable 
firm characteristics. As I do not have a binary treatment (i.e., treatment or no treatment), I 
have to create a cutoff point (e.g., median, quartiles, deciles) for a firm’s labor intensity. I 
group firms in the top decile of labor intensity versus all other firms as such cutoff point 
allows me to form pairings that result in observations with insignificant propensity-score 
differences without having to remove any dissimilar matched pairs. The drawback of this 
approach is that I only have a subset of enforcement actions, i.e., 102 firm-year observations, 35 
 
in my final matched sample.
29 To calculate each non-labor-intensive firm’s propensity score to 
be in the top decile of labor intensity, I run the following probit regression model, where 
subscript i represents the firm and t the year:  
   	      	     	             	                    	    																												 8  
 
This regression includes the same variables as model (1) in Table 4 except for the firm’s 
labor intensity, the election year indicator, and the senior congressman indicator, which are 
my variables of interest. Due to the small number of firm-year observations subject to an 
AAER, I cannot test H2b with this alternative research design. All variables are defined as 
before and as described in Table 1. The results of this probit model are shown in Table 7, 
Panel A and are comparable to the results reported in Table 4. Matched pairs are formed by 
selecting an observation that received the treatment, i.e., top decile in labor intensity, and 
selecting another observation with the closest propensity score that did not receive the 
treatment. This matching process is done without replacement, indicating that labor-intensive 
observations do not have the same non-labor-intensive observation as a pair. As reported in 
Table 7, Panel B, the results of the mean comparisons of matched pairs indicate that the 
matching procedure successfully finds non-top decile labor intensity firms that are similar to 
the top decile labor intensity firms. In particular, there are no significant differences between 
my 9,550 matched pairs of top decile labor intensity and non-top decile labor intensity firms 
in any of the observable variables used in my matching procedure. To test H1 with this 
alternative research design, I measure the difference in the likelihood or receiving an AAER 
                                                 
29 As an alternative, I also use the median of firms’ labor intensity as a cutoff point. Using that cutoff point, I 
have to drop an even larger number of observations. In particular, this approach results in a subset of 13,028 
firm-year observations, including 91 firm-year observations subject to SEC enforcement actions. Therefore, I use 
the top decile cutoff point for the tests reported. The results using this alternative cutoff point, however, do not 
alter my primary inferences. It is important to note that both cutoff points do not induce estimation bias as both 
cutoff points only identify and remove matched pairs for which the matching algorithm did not produce an 
effective covariate match (Armstrong et al., 2010).  36 
between firms that are in the top decile of labor intensity and the matched non-top decile labor 
intensity firms. The results of this comparison are shown in Table 7, Panel C and indicate that 
the matched non-labor-intensive firms are more likely to receive an AAER than the matched 
labor-intensive firms. Thus, the propensity score matching provides additional evidence in 
favor of H1.  
To further test H2 with this alternative research design, I run the following logistic 
regression model on the matched sample of 9,550 matched pairs of labor-intensive and non-
labor-intensive firms: 
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These regressions include my variables of interest, i.e., top decile of labor intensity 
indicator, the election year indicator, the senior congressman indicator, and the interaction 
between these variables, respectively. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 7, 
Panel D. I find a negative and significant coefficient on β1, i.e., a firm’s labor intensity, and 
β3, i.e., the interaction term between the election year dummy and a firm’s labor intensity. 
Thus, the propensity score matching also provides additional evidence in favor of H2a. As the 
coefficient on the interaction term between the senior congressman indicator and a firm’s 
labor intensity is not significant, I do not find additional evidence in favor or H2c. It is, 
however, important to notice that one potential explanation for this result is a lack of power in 
my test. In particular, in my matched sample there are only 12 firm-year observations of 
labor-intensive firms that are located in a district of a senior congressman who serves on a 
committee overseeing the SEC.   
- Table 7 here - 
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3.3.4.  Partisanship of Presidential administration  
I also investigate whether the preference for labor-intensive firms is dependent on an 
administration’s partisanship. In unreported tests, I find that the partisanship of the president 
does not affect the likelihood of enforcement against labor-intensive firms.  
 
3.3.5.  Comment letters   
Finally, I conduct an additional test to provide more insights at what stages of the 
enforcement process government preferences are likely to influence SEC’s enforcement 
actions. While my main tests use AAERs, which are the end product of investigations as 
opposed to the initial investigations themselves, I also run an additional test using SEC 
comment letters. The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance reviews company filings and 
sends comment letters to firms if it believes that these filings can be improved (SEC, 2013b). 
The Division of Corporation Finance typically begins with a preliminary review of a firm’s 
filings.
30 Based on this preliminary review, the Division may decide to undertake a further 
review, which may result in a comment letter if the staff believes that disclosure can be 
improved. The company will typically respond by sending a letter to the SEC and there may 
be several rounds of correspondence until the SEC advises the company that the review of the 
filing is complete (Cassell et al., 2013). As the Division of Corporation Finance may refer 
cases to the Division of Enforcement, comment letters may trigger an enforcement action. 
Feroz et al. (1991) refer to a speech by Robert Sack, the former Chief Accountant of the 
Enforcement Division, who indicated that, in his opinion, the SEC obtains 50% of the leads 
from reviews of financial statements and securities offerings, suggesting that these reviews are 
                                                 
30 The selection criteria for this preliminary review are not publicly disclosed. However, since the passage of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, the SEC is required to undertake some level of review of a firm’s filings at least once every 
three years (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). 38 
an important trigger event for SEC’s enforcement actions. A resource-constrained SEC that is 
likely to adjust its enforcement actions in accordance with government’s preference to foster 
employment might also allocate fewer resources to reviews of labor-intensive firms. As a 
consequence, labor-intensive firms are less likely to receive a comment letter. In order to test 
whether labor-intensive firms are indeed less likely to receive a comment letter and receive 
fewer comment letters, respectively, I use the following regression model where subscript i 
represents the firm and t the year: 
Comment	Letter  
 	β   β  Labor	Intensity    	 β Control	Variables  
 
 	e  											 11 	
COMMENT LETTER is either the number of letters exchanged between a company and 
the SEC or an indicator variable that is one in the years a firm received a comment letter from 
the SEC, and zero otherwise. The time period for this analysis is limited to the period 2004-
2010 as comment and response letters are only publicly available from 2004 onwards. All 
other variables are defined as before.  
The results of this additional test are shown in Table 8. I find that labor-intensive firms 
are less likely to receive a comment letter and the total number of letters exchanged between 
the SEC and a labor-intensive firm is also lower. This result suggests that the SEC allocates 
fewer resources to reviews of firms that contribute to the employment conditions. To the 
extent that these reviews are an important trigger event of an enforcement action, allocating 
fewer resources to reviews of labor-intensive firms might result in fewer investigations and 
enforcement actions by the Division of Enforcement. In contrast, firms that have a higher F-
score and thus potentially a lower accounting quality, firms that are located further away from 
the SEC office, and firms that engage in more lobbying are more likely to receive a comment 
letter and have a more extensive correspondence with the SEC. These latter findings suggest 39 
 
that the SEC is in general more likely to conduct reviews of firms that have a higher 
likelihood of misstating their financial statements (Cassell et al., 2013).  
- Table 8 here - 
4.  Conclusions 
The SEC has been criticized for its failure to detect several accounting fraud scandals in 
the last decade. As a consequence, a growing literature in accounting examines the reasons for 
such failure by studying the SEC’s choice of enforcement targets. Studies in this growing 
literature find that the SEC’s resource constraints as well as political pressure as a result of 
firms’ political connections or lobbying activities on the SEC affect the agency’s choice of 
enforcement targets. Economists, however, have long argued that regulators such as the SEC 
are influenced by the president and Congress (“government”) and that the government 
responds to both voter and special interest pressure by adjusting its political decisions 
accordingly to maximize political support. As voters’ political support is largely affected by 
the employment conditions, the government is likely to have preferences for firms that 
contribute to these conditions. Thus, I investigate whether the SEC, as a consequence of 
government pressure, reduces its enforcement actions for labor-intensive firms, a proxy for a 
firm’s contribution to employment conditions. My results indicate that labor-intensive firms 
are less likely to face an SEC enforcement action, after controlling for firm size, performance, 
accounting quality, location, and political contributions, among others. I further exploit the 
variation in government’s sensitivity to voters’ interests as well as government’s power over 
the SEC to provide more robust evidence that labor-intensive firms face less SEC enforcement 
actions due to government preferences for these firms instead of, for instance, higher 
accounting quality of labor-intensive firms. I find that the lower likelihood of SEC 
enforcement actions against labor-intensive firms is even more pronounced in presidential 
election years and is concentrated in politically important states. I also find evidence that 40 
firms located in districts with senior congressmen serving on committees that oversee the SEC 
face a lower likelihood of SEC enforcement.   
I further investigate whether labor-intensive firms’ lower likelihood of being subject to an 
AAER can be explained by the accounting quality of these firms. My findings suggest that 
labor-intensive firms have a lower accounting quality than their less labor-intensive peers, 
indicating that fewer SEC enforcement actions against labor-intensive firms cannot be 
explained by those firms’ higher accounting quality. 
Finally, I run several sensitivity tests such as splitting my measure of labor intensity into 
U.S. and non-U.S. labor intensity and applying propensity score matching as an alternative 
research design. The results from these additional tests corroborate my findings. 
My study has several limitations. First, AAERs only represent the end product of SEC’s 
enforcement actions as opposed to the initial investigations themselves. Thus, I cannot 
conclusively state or test at which exact stage of the SEC enforcement process political 
pressure impact the enforcement process. However, by investigating the likelihood of 
receiving an SEC comment letter as an additional test, I find evidence that labor-intensive 
firms are less likely to receive a comment letter, suggesting that the resource-constrained SEC 
allocates fewer resources to reviews of firms that contribute to the employment conditions. 
Second, my study only controls for the tenure of the SEC Chairman but ignores that SEC 
Commissioners themselves might have incentives to impact the SEC enforcement process 
around the end of their terms.  
Overall, my results indicate that voters’ interests drive political pressure on the SEC and 
that the SEC incorporates such pressure in its enforcement actions, independent of firms’ 
lobbying for their special interests. Future research could explore other types of firms that the 
government has preferences for and the costs and benefits arising out of this preferential 
treatment in greater detail. 
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Appendix A: Top 10 most important states per presidential election
a 
 
Top 10, 1984    Top 10, 1988    Top 10, 1992 
Rank  State Score  Rank  State  Score  Rank  State  Score 
1  MN  85.00   1  VT  5.57   1  GA  11.61 
2  RI 8.54   2  WA  5.35   2  NC  8.32 
3  MA  5.83   3  IL  4.01   3  NH  7.47 
4  MD  3.48   4  PA  3.78   4  NV  3.69 
5  HI 3.37   5  MD  3.19   5  MT  3.57 
6  IA 2.62   6  NM  3.07   6  AZ  3.37 
7  VT 2.39   7  MT  2.96   7  WY  3.28 
8  PA 2.24   8  WV  2.57   8  SD  3.11 
9  NY  2.11   9  WI  2.20   9  FL  3.04 
10  WV 2.07   10  NY  2.15   10  OH  2.84 
             
Top 10, 1996    Top 10, 2000    Top 10, 2004 
Rank  State Score  Rank  State  Score  Rank  State  Score 
1  NV  13.47   1  FL  1115.40   1  WI  18.56 
2  KY  9.56   2  NM  327.31   2  NM  13.34 
3  GA  7.67   3  WI  46.17   3  IA  11.38 
4  CO  6.16   4  IA  40.47   4  NH  9.57 
5  VA  4.38   5  OR  24.79   5  NV  5.09 
6  SD 4.26   6  NH  13.29   6  PA  3.61 
7  AZ 4.08   7  NV  4.43   7  OH  3.21 
8  MT  4.07   8  MN  4.09   8  HI  2.36 
9  TN 3.84   9  MO  3.35   9  DE  2.32 
10  ND 2.63   10  TN  3.28   10  OR  2.28 
            
Top 10, 2008    Top 10, 2012         
Rank State  Score    Rank  State  Score      
1 MO  86.85    1  FL  11.95         
2 NC  32.60    2  NC  4.99         
3 IN  11.94    3  OH  3.32         
4 MT  8.33    4  NH  3.09         
5 FL  3.52    5  NV  2.71         
6 ND  3.38    6  VA  2.67         
7 SD  2.88    7  AK  2.19         
8 OH  2.35    8  CO  2.00         
9 GA  2.26    9  IA  1.98         
10 NH  1.80    10  PA  1.95         
 
Notes to Appendix A:  
a Appendix A includes an overview of the top ten most important states per presidential election over the period 1982-2012. I follow the 
methodology of Cebula et al. (2013) and express the political importance of a state by dividing the number of Electoral College votes at stake 
by the margin of victory for the winning candidate, denoted “Score”. The states are then ranked in descending order for each U.S. 
presidential election based on that score. 47 
 
Table 1: Overview of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
   AAER Dummy   1 in the years a misstatement occurred as reported in the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, and zero otherwise.  
   Number of Comment Letters  Number of comment letters a firm has either received or sent to the SEC. 
   Comment Letter Dummy  1 in the years a firm has received a comment letter from the SEC, and zero otherwise.  
Variables of interest 
   Labor Intensity 
Firm’s total employees (Compustat item: EMP) scaled by firm’s total average assets (Compustat item: AT; sum of beginning and 
end of year total assets divided by two); adjusted by subtracting the two-digit SIC code median-industry labor intensity to arrive at 
my final measure of labor intensity. 
   (Non-)U.S. Labor Intensity   Firm’s (non-)U.S. employees (Compustat Segments item: EMPS) scaled by firm’s (non-)U.S. total average assets (Compustat 
Segments item: IAS; sum of beginning and end of year total assets divided by two). 
   Election Year  1 in all presidential election years (i.e., 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012), and zero otherwise. 
   Important State 
1 for the top ten most important states for each U.S. presidential election, and zero otherwise. The top ten most important states are 
defined by following the methodology of Cebula et al. (2013) who express the political importance of a state by dividing the 
number of Electoral College votes at stake by the margin of victory for the winning candidate. The states are then ranked in 
descending order for each U.S. presidential election.  
   Senior Congressman 
1 if a firm’s headquarters are located in a congressional district with a congressman who has served for at least one complete term 
on the Appropriations, Banking or Commerce committee, and zero otherwise. To construct this variable data is obtained from 
Charles Stewart’s Congressional Data webpage for all members of the House for the time period 1982-2012 and every firm is 
matched to a specific district based on its zip code as reported in Compustat. Firms located in states that only have one 
congressional district (i.e., Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) are excluded. 
Control Variables 
   F-score 1 
Predicted value = -7.893 + 0.79 * RSST accruals + 2.518 * Change in receivables + 1.191 * Change in inventory + 1.979 * % Soft 
assets + 0.171 * Change in cash sales + -0.932 * Change in ROA + 1.029 * Actual issuance. Based on this predicted value the 
probability is calculated as e
(predicted value)/(1+e
(predicted value)). To arrive at the F-score the probability is divided by the unconditional 
probability, i.e., misstating firm-years/(non-misstating firm-years + misstating firm years). For more details see Dechow et al. 
(2011).  
   F-score 2 
Predicted value = -8.252 + 0.665 * RSST accruals + 2.457 * Change in receivables + 1.393 * Change in inventory + 2.011 * % Soft 
assets + 0.159 * Change in cash sales + -1.029 * Change in ROA + 0.983 * Actual issuance + -0.15 * Abnormal change in 
employees + 0.419 * Existence of operating leases. Based on this predicted value the probability is calculated as e
(predicted 
value)/(1+e
(predicted value)). To arrive at the F-score the probability is divided by the unconditional probability, i.e., misstating firm-
years/(non-misstating firm-years + misstating firm years). For more details see Dechow et al. (2011). 
   F-score 3 
Predicted value = -7.966 + 0.909 * RSST accruals + 1.731 * Change in receivables + 1.447 * Change in inventory + 2.265 * % Soft 
assets + 0.160 * Change in cash sales + -1.455 * Change in ROA + 0.651 * Actual issuance + -0.121 * Abnormal change in 
employees + 0.345 * Existence of operating leases + 0.082 * Market-adjusted stock return + 0.098 * lagged market-adjusted stock 
return. Based on this predicted value the probability is calculated as e
(predicted value)/(1+e
(predicted value)). To arrive at the F-score the 
probability is divided by the unconditional probability, i.e., misstating firm-years/(non-misstating firm-years + misstating firm 
years). For more details see Dechow et al. (2011). 
   Mod. Jones Dis. Acc.   
Discretionary accruals using the following modified Jones model as in Dechow et al. (2011): ∆               1      ⁄   
	  
∆   	∆    
    
 	   
∆    
    
     ) where ΔWCt = ΔARt + ΔInventoryt – ΔAPt – ΔTPt + Δother Assets (net)t. AR is accounts receivable, 
AP is accounts payable, TP is taxes payable. S is sales, Rec accounts receivables, At-1 beginning of the year assets and PPE is 
property, plant and equipment. The unsigned estimated residuals are my proxy for discretionary accruals. 
   DD Dis. Acc. 
Discretionary accruals according to Dechow and Dichev (2002), using the following OLS model: ∆               1      ⁄   
	          	                        where ΔWCt is defined the same as for the modified Jones model and CFO is cash flow 
from operations. The unsigned estimated residuals are my proxy for discretionary accruals.  
   Restatement   1 in the years a restatement has been released by firms, and zero otherwise. Restatements include intentional as well as 
unintentional misstatements as per the criteria of Hennes et al. (2008).  
   Proximate 100 
1 if a firm’s headquarters is located within 100 km distance to the SEC office, i.e., SEC offices in Washington, DC, New York City, 
NY, Miami, FL, Chicago, IL, Denver, CO, and Los Angeles, CA, and zero otherwise. For more details see Kedia and Rajgopal 
(2011).  
   PAC Contributions  A firm’s PAC contributions as reported in the FEC dataset scaled by total average assets.  
   Lobbying Exp  A firm’s lobbying expenditures as reported in the CRP dataset scaled by total average assets.  
   Union  Percentage of employees who are union members per four-digit SIC code as reported in the Union Membership and Coverage 
Database maintained by (Hirsch and Macpherson (2003)). 
   Log Analysts Following  Natural logarithm of the number of analysts issuing annual earnings forecasts for firms covered by IBES. Set equal to zero if the 
firm is not covered by IBES. 
   Fortune 500   1 if the firm is covered in the Fortune 500 index as reported in Compustat, zero otherwise. 
   ROA  Two-digit SIC code median-adjusted return on assets, i.e., Compustat item: IB / Total average assets. 
   Big 4  1 if a firm’s auditor is a Big 4 auditor, zero otherwise.  
   Market-to-book  Firm’s market value scaled by firm’s book value, i.e., (Compustat item: CSHO * Compustat item: PRCC)  / Compustat item: CEQ.
   Leverage   Firm’s long-term debt scaled by firm’s total average assets, i.e., Compustat item: DLTT / Total average assets. 
   Log Firm Age  Natural logarithm of a firm’s age; based on first time appearance in Compustat.  
   Log Assets  Natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, i.e., Compustat item: AT.  
   SEC Chairman  Fixed effects for the tenure of each SEC Chairman as reported on the SEC homepage 
(http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm). 
   U.S. President  Fixed effects for the tenure of each U.S. President.48 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics for years 1982 to 2012
a 
Variable N  Mean  Std.  Min  1
st Median  3
rd Max 
Labor Intensity  93,207  0.002  .008  -.011  -.001  0  .004  .052 
Employees 93,207  6.823  18.524  .003  .179  .837  3.992  127.5 
F-score 1  93,207  1  .727  .120  .484  .819  1.284  4.287 
F-score 2  93,207  1  .758  .107  .464  .810  1.230  4.419 
F-score 3  93,207  1  .809  .130  .480  .847  1.387  4.624 
DD Dis. Acc.  93,207  0.062  0.070  0  0.016  0.038  0.079  0.334 
Mod. Jones Dis. Acc.  93,207  0.056  0.061  0  0.014  0.035  0.074  0.292 
Proximate 100  93,207  .313  .464  0  0  0  1  1 
PAC Contribution Dummy  93,207  .274  .446  0  0  0  1  1 
PAC Contributions  93,207  14,646  211,891  0  0  0  570  291,268 
Lobbying Amount  55,913  71,621  284,129  0  0  0  0  1,740,000 
Union 93,207  0.115  0.116  0  0.027  0.0755  0.162  0.499 
Analyst Following  93,207  4.47  6.14  0  0  2  6  28 
ROA 93,207  -.057  .228  -1.16  -.074  0  .052  .284 
Big 4  93,207  .814  .389  0  1  1  1  1 
Market-to-Book 93,207  2.804  4.544  -12.751  1.069  1.825  3.261  29.268 
Leverage 93,207  .179  .199  0  .003  .119  .292  .898 
Firm Age  93,207  14.92  14.08  2  5  10  20  71 
Assets 93,207  1,808  5,790  2.12  32.79  140.98  738.16  41,959 
Notes to Table 2, Panel A:  
a The table displays the summary statistics of the full sample for all variables over the period 1982-2012. See Table 1 for variable 
definitions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Statistics for more vs. less labor-intensive firms
b 
Variable N  Higher labor 
intensity (1) 
Lower labor intensity 
(2)   Difference (1) – (2) 
Labor Intensity  93,207  .007  -0.002  .009*** 
Employees 93,207  7.030  6.615  0.415*** 
F-score 1  93,207  1.07  .923  .147*** 
F-score 2  93,207  1.07  .927  .143*** 
F-score 3  93,207  1.13  .984  .146*** 
DD Dis. Acc.  93,207  0.065  0.059  0.006*** 
Mod. Jones Dis. Acc.  93,207  0.059  0.053  0.006*** 
Proximate 100  93,207  .308  .318  -.01*** 
PAC Contribution Dummy  93,207  .256  .293  -0.037*** 
PAC Contributions  93,207  8,472  20,819  -12,347*** 
Lobbying Amount  55,913  40,486  100,746  -60,260*** 
Union 93,207  0.114  0.117  -0.003*** 
Analyst Following  93,207  3.43  5.51  -2.08*** 
ROA 93,207  -.048  -.067  .019*** 
Big 4  93,207  .785  .844  -.059*** 
Market-to-Book 93,207 2.82  2.79  .03 
Leverage 93,207  .174  .184  -.010*** 
Firm Age  93,207  15.02  14.83  .19** 
Assets 93,207  987  2,629  -1,642*** 
Notes to Table 2, Panel B:  
b The table displays average values of the variables over the period 1982-2012 for two groups of firms: (i) more labor-intensive firms; and 
(ii) less labor-intensive firms. I constructed these groups by splitting the sample at the median value of the variable labor intensity. The table 
also displays the differences between the means of these variables. ***, **, and * indicate the signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively, of the difference between the means of the more labor-intensive firms sample as compared to the less labor-intensive firms 
sample. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Statistics for AAER vs. non-AAER sample
c 
Variable  N  AAER sample (1)  N  Non-AAER sample (2)   Difference (1) – (2) 
Labor Intensity  694  .0008  92,513  0.0024  -.0016*** 
Employees 694  12.35 92,513  6.783  5.567*** 
F-score 1  694  1.47  92,513  1  .47*** 
F-score 2  694  1.51  92,513  1  .51*** 
F-score 3  694  1.61  92,513  1.06  .55*** 
DD Dis. Acc.  694  0.077  92,513  0.062  0.015*** 
Mod. Jones Dis. Acc.  694  0.067  92,513  0.056  0.011*** 
Proximate 100  694  .369  92,513  .312  .057*** 
PAC Contribution Dummy  694  .412  92,513  .273  0.13*** 
PAC Contributions  694  27,265  92,513  14,555  12,710* 
Lobbying Amount  509  113,658  55,404  71,235  42,423*** 
Union 694  0.096  92,513 0.115  -0.019*** 
Analyst Following  694  7.51  92,513  4.45  3.06*** 
ROA 694  -.029  92,513 -.058  .029*** 
Big 4  694  .859  92,513  .814  .044*** 
Market-to-Book 694  3.75  92,513  2.80  .954*** 
Leverage 694  .188 92,513  .179  .009 
Firm Age  694  13.87  92,513  14.93  -1.06** 
Assets 694  3,243  92,513 1,798  1,445*** 
Notes to Table 2, Panel C:  
c The table displays average values of the variables over the period 1982–2012 for two groups of ﬁrms: (i) the AAER sample, i.e., firms that 
received an AAER; and (ii) the non-AAER sample, i.e., firms that did not receive an AAER; and the differences between the means of these 
variables. ***, **, and * indicate the signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, of the difference between the means of the 
AAER sample as compared to the non-AAER sample. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   
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Table 3: Test of hypothesis 1 
Panel A: Logistic regression estimation of the probability of being subject to an AAER
a 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Variables AAER  Dummy  AAER 
Dummy 
AAER 
Dummy 
AAER 
Dummy 
AAER 
Dummy 
AAER 
Dummy  AAER Dummy 
                    
Labor Intensity  -23.147**  -22.581**  -
28.610***  -20.810** -23.347***  -34.659***  -21.795** 
(0.02)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.05) 
F-score  1  0.476***      0.476*** 0.474*** 0.483***  0.547*** 
(0.00)      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
F-score  2  0.454***      
(0.00)      
F-score  3    0.424***     
  (0.00)     
Proximate 100  0.346**  0.337**  0.338*  0.344**  0.348**  0.171  0.274** 
(0.05)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.41)  (0.05) 
PAC Contribution  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001    0.001 
 (0.49)  (0.46)  (0.45)  (0.49)  (0.49)    (0.86) 
Lobbying Exp            -0.001*   
           (0.06)   
Union  0.013  0.014 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.004  -0.009 
  (0.32)  (0.32) (0.24) (0.32) (0.32) (0.84)  (0.24) 
Log Analyst Following  0.287***  0.299***  0.297***  0.286***  0.301***  0.606***  0.343*** 
(0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Fortune  500  -0.243  -0.251 -0.274 -0.244 -0.221 -0.351  -0.084 
  (0.28)  (0.26) (0.22) (0.28) (0.32) (0.19)  (0.75) 
ROA  0.026  0.106 0.312 0.028 0.028 0.332  0.074 
(0.92)  (0.69) (0.30) (0.92) (0.92) (0.36)  (0.81) 
Big 4  -0.550**  -0.509**  -0.508**  -0.549**  -0.550***  -0.174  -0.466** 
(0.02)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.62)  (0.02) 
Market-to-Book 0.026***  0.026***  0.020**  0.026***  0.027***  0.013  0.027*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27)  (0.01) 
Leverage  0.128  0.134 0.124 0.123 0.109 0.213  -0.274 
(0.69)  (0.68) (0.73) (0.70) (0.74) (0.58)  (0.44) 
Log Firm Age  -0.194**  -0.213**  -0.244**  -0.201**  -0.204**  0.013  -0.220*** 
(0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.90)  (0.01) 
Log Assets  0.243***  0.246***  0.258***  0.233***  0.246***  0.157*  0.180*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)  (0.00) 
Constant -10.063***  -10.092***  -
10.044***  -9.950*** -10.112***  -10.577***  -9.293*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
     
SEC  Chairman  Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
U.S.  President  Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Clustered by  Firm Firm  Firm  Firm  Firm  Firm  Firm  and  Industry 
Observations  79,597  78,598 72,494 79,597 79,597 38,419  84,970 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.124  0.126 0.137 0.124 0.123 0.154  0.099 
Notes to Table 3, Panel A:  
a The dependent variable for all the models presented here is an indicator variable that is equal to one in the years a firm has been convicted 
for allegedly misstating its financial statements as reported in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, and zero otherwise for the 
period 1982–2012. The results reported are from a logistic regression estimation. The models differ in the variables included and sample 
composition. In particular, model 1, 2 and 3 differ in the F-score control variable. In Model 4 labor intensity is not adjusted by the two-digit 
SIC code median-industry labor intensity. In Model 5 labor intensity is adjusted by the four-digit SIC code median-industry labor intensity. 
Model 6 includes a control variable for a firm’s lobbying efforts instead of a firm’s PAC contributions. As the data on lobbying expenditures 
is only available from 1998 onwards, this model is limited to the period 1998-2012. Model 7 includes the same variables as model 1. 
However, I exclude industry dummies and cluster by both year and industry instead. This approach increases the sample size. P-values are 
displayed in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimate. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed), 
respectively; variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   
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Panel B: Marginal effects
b 
  
Variables Marginal  Effect 
     
Probability of Labor Intensity at Upper Quartile  .00413 
 
Probability of Labor Intensity at Lower Quartile  .00465 
 
Interquartile Marginal Change  -.00052 
  
Interquartile Marginal Change in %  -11.18% 
Notes to Table 3, Panel B:  
b The marginal effect presented here is calculated based on model 1, Table 3, Panel A. All variables except for labor intensity are at their 
mean values to calculate the probabilities at the upper and lower quartile of labor intensity. 
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Table 4: Test of hypothesis 2 
Panel A: Logistic regression estimation of the probability of being subject to an AAER 
in an election year (in highly contested states)
a 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables  AAER Dummy  AAER Dummy  AAER Dummy  AAER Dummy 
  
Labor Intensity  -16.112*  -21.542*  -23.932**  -23.942* 
(0.09)  (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) 
Election Year  -0.935**  -0.915**  -0.872**  -0.848* 
(0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Labor Intensity * Election Year  -26.614*  -22.617**  -8.170  -9.037 
(0.08)  (0.03) (0.59) (0.38) 
Important State      -0.128  -0.146 
     (0.52)  (0.46) 
Important State * Labor Intensity      25.648  29.720 
     (0.15)  (0.20) 
Important State * Election Year      0.213  0.191 
     (0.36)  (0.41) 
Labor Intensity * Election Year * Important State      -74.299*  -67.539* 
     (0.10)  (0.07) 
F-score 1  0.439***  0.522***  0.477***  0.550*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Proximate 100  0.342**  0.274**  0.339**  0.269** 
(0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
PAC Contribution  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
(0.42)  (0.45) (0.50) (0.57) 
Union 0.014  -0.010  0.014  -0.009 
  (0.30)  (0.21) (0.32) (0.26) 
Log Analyst Following  0.246**  0.295**  0.287***  0.335*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Fortune 500  -0.263  -0.112  -0.238  -0.092 
  (0.24)  (0.66) (0.29) (0.72) 
ROA -0.061  -0.016  0.037  0.072 
(0.81)  (0.97) (0.89) (0.80) 
Big 4  -0.588***  -0.503**  -0.552**  -0.476** 
(0.01)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Market-to-Book 0.020**  0.021**  0.026***  0.027** 
(0.03)  (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) 
Leverage 0.066  -0.355  0.140  -0.280 
(0.84)  (0.37) (0.66) (0.44) 
Log Firm Age  -0.182**  -0.196**  -0.196**  -0.211*** 
(0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Log Assets  0.257***  0.198**  0.229***  0.178*** 
(0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -10.075***  -9.295***  -10.045***  -9.247*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
SEC Chairman Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
U.S. President Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered by   Firm  Firm and Industry  Firm  Firm and Industry 
Observations 79,597  84,970  79,597  84,970 
Pseudo R-squared  0.120  0.096  0.125  0.103 
Notes to Table 4, Panel A:  
a The dependent variable for all the models presented here is an indicator variable that is equal to one in the years a firm has been convicted for 
allegedly misstating its financial statements as reported in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, and zero otherwise for the period 1982–
2012. The results reported are from a logistic regression estimation. The models differ in the variables included and sample composition. In particular, 
model 1 and 2 provide the results for testing H2a and model 3 and 4 provide the results for testing H2b. In addition, model 1 and 3 include industry 
dummies and I cluster by firm, whereas model 2 and 4 do not include industry dummies and I cluster by both year and industry instead. This approach 
increases the sample size. P-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimate. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level (two-tailed), respectively; variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   53 
 
Panel B: Marginal effects
b 
 
Variables  Marginal Effect in Election Year  Marginal Effect in Non-Election Year 
 
Probability of Labor Intensity at Upper Quartile  .0009  .0026 
  
Probability of Labor Intensity at Lower Quartile  .0012  .0029 
  
Interquartile Marginal Change  -.0003  -.0003 
    
Interquartile Marginal Change in %  -25.00%  -10.34% 
Notes to Table 4, Panel B:  
b The marginal effects presented here are calculated based on model 1, Table 4, Panel A. All variables except for labor intensity and election 
year are at their mean values to calculate the probabilities at the upper and lower quartile of labor intensity. 
 
Panel C: Logistic regression estimation of the probability of being subject to an AAER 
if headquartered in a district of a senior congressman who serves on SEC committee
c 
(1) (2) 
Variables AAER  Dummy  AAER  Dummy 
Labor Intensity  -18.969*  -20.726* 
(0.09) (0.10) 
Senior Congressman  0.168  0.153 
(0.23) (0.23) 
Labor Intensity * Senior Congressman  -29.322*  -24.979* 
(0.10) (0.10) 
F-score 1  0.469***  0.543*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Proximate 100  0.322*  0.253* 
(0.07) (0.07) 
PAC Contribution  0.001  0.001 
(0.51) (0.56) 
Union 0.013  -0.008 
 (0.35)  (0.29) 
Log Analyst Following  0.341***  0.387*** 
 (0.00)  (0.02) 
Fortune 500  -0.259  -0.138 
 (0.26)  (0.61) 
ROA 0.074  0.112 
(0.78) (0.70) 
Big 4  -0.490**  -0.419* 
(0.03) (0.06) 
Market-to-Book 0.025***  0.025** 
(0.00) (0.03) 
Leverage 0.105  -0.312 
(0.74) (0.41) 
Log Firm Age  -0.192**  -0.213*** 
(0.02) (0.01) 
Log Assets  0.188***  0.142*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -9.908***  -9.164*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
    
SEC Chairman Dummies  Yes  Yes 
U.S. President Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  No 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Clustered by   Firm  Firm and Industry 
Observations 78,071  83,300 
Pseudo R-squared  0.123  0.099 54 
Notes to Table 4, Panel C:  
a The dependent variable for all the models presented here is an indicator variable that is equal to one in the years a firm has been convicted 
for allegedly misstating its financial statements as reported in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, and zero otherwise for the 
period 1982–2012. The results reported are from a logistic regression estimation. The models differ in the variables included and sample 
composition. In particular, model 1 includes industry dummies and I cluster by firm, whereas model 2 does not include industry dummies 
and I cluster by both year and industry instead. This approach increases the sample size. P-values are displayed in parentheses below the 
coefﬁcient estimate. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed), respectively; variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99% levels. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   
 
Panel D: Marginal effects
d 
 
Variables  Marginal Effect in District of Senior 
Congressman 
Marginal Effect outside of District of 
Senior Congressman 
 
Probability of Labor Intensity at Upper 
Quartile  .0017 .0017 
  
Probability of Labor Intensity at Lower 
Quartile  .0024 .00185 
  
Interquartile Marginal Change  -.0007  -.00015 
    
Interquartile Marginal Change in %  -29.17%  -8.11% 
Notes to Table 4, Panel D:  
b The marginal effects presented here are calculated based on model 1, Table 4, Panel C. All variables except for labor intensity and senior 
congressman are at their mean values to calculate the probabilities at the upper and lower quartile of labor intensity. 
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Table 5: OLS and logistic regression estimation of accounting quality on labor intensity
a 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Variables  F-score 1  F-score 2 F-score 3 Mod. Jones Dis. Acc. DD Dis. Acc.   Restatement  
 
Labor Intensity  8.455***  8.562***  8.575***  0.091***  0.085*  7.814* 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.10) 
ROA 0.187***  0.139***  0.176***  -0.043***  -0.036***  -1.105*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Big 4  -0.104***  -0.099***  -0.111***  -0.005***  -0.006***  -0.119 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.20) 
Market-to-Book 0.007***  0.007***  0.008***  0.000*** 0.001***  -0.11* 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.10) 
Leverage 0.336***  0.397***  0.376***  -0.007***  0.016***  .184 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.25) 
Log Firm Age  -0.089***  -0.096***  -0.077***  -0.003***  -0.005***  -0.017 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.70) 
Log Assets  0.037***  0.042***  0.039***  -0.006***  -0.004***  0.170*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant 0.759***  0.680***  0.721***  0.119***  0.034***  -3.674*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
            
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered by  Firm  Firm  Firm  Firm  Firm  Firm 
Observations 93,207  91,953  85,215  91,870  72,954  37,907 
Adj. R-squared / 
Pseudo R-squared  0.174 0.183  0.186  0.177  0.134  0.084 
Notes to Table 5:  
a The dependent variable for all the models presented here is a different proxy for a firm’s accounting quality for the period 1982-2012 
(model 1-5) and 1997-2006 (model 6). The first three models use all three types of F-scores as defined by Dechow et al. (2011). The 
dependent variables in model 4 and model 5, respectively, are absolute discretionary accruals estimated from a modified Jones model as in 
Dechow et al. (2011) and estimated according to Dechow and Dichev (2002), respectively. The dependent variable in model 6 is an 
indicator variable that is one in the years a restatement has been released by firms, and zero otherwise. The results reported for models 1-5 
are from an ordinary least squares regression estimation and for model 6 from a logistic regression estimation. P-values are displayed in 
parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimate. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed), respectively; 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   
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Table 6: Logistic regression estimation of the probability of being subject to an AAER 
with US vs. non-US labor intensity
a 
   (1)  (2) 
Variables  AAER Dummy  AAER Dummy 
        
US Labor Intensity  -49.744**  -49.744** 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Non-US Labor Intensity  -10.640  -11.014 
 (0.75)  (0.74) 
F-score 1  0.511***  0.513*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Proximate 100  0.635  0.644 
(0.18) (0.18) 
PAC Contribution  0.001   
(0.99)  
Lobbying Exp    -0.001 
   (0.54) 
Union 0.004  0.041 
 (0.51)  (0.51) 
Log Analyst Following  0.400  0.401 
 (0.22)  (0.22) 
Fortune 500  -0.737  -0.746 
 (0.26)  (0.25) 
ROA -0.989  -0.989 
(0.32) (0.32) 
Big 4  -0.849*  -0.823 
(0.10) (0.11) 
Market-to-Book 0.011  0.011 
(0.72) (0.72) 
Leverage 0.987  0.986 
(0.33) (0.33) 
Log Firm Age  0.176  0.191 
(0.50) (0.50) 
Log Assets  0.453**  0.452** 
(0.02) (0.01) 
Constant -11.157***  -11.157*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
SEC Chairman Dummies  Yes  Yes 
U.S. President Dummies  Yes  Yes   
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes 
Clustered by  Firm Firm 
Observations 5,018  5,018 
Pseudo R-squared  0.241  0.241 
Notes to Table 6:  
a The dependent variable for all the models presented here is an indicator variable that is equal to one in the years a firm has been convicted 
for allegedly misstating its financial statements as reported in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, and zero otherwise for the 
period 1999–2012. The results reported are from a logistic regression estimation. Model 2 includes a control variable for a firm’s lobbying 
efforts instead of a firm’s PAC contributions. As the data on lobbying expenditures is only available from 1998 onwards, this model is 
limited to the period 1998-2012. P-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimate. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed), respectively; variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   
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Table 7: Propensity Score Matching 
Panel A: Probit Regression Estimation of the Probability of being in the Top Decile of 
labor intensity
a 
  
Variables  Top Decile Labor Intensity 
  
F-score 1  0.127*** 
(0.00) 
Proximate 100  -0.024* 
(0.08) 
PAC Contribution  0.002*** 
  (0.00) 
Union  -0.007*** 
  (0.00) 
Log Analyst Following  -0.044*** 
  (0.00) 
Fortune 500  0.103*** 
  (0.00) 
ROA  0.812*** 
(0.00) 
Big 4  0.040** 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book  -0.003*** 
(0.00) 
Leverage  0.175*** 
(0.00) 
Log Firm Age  0.046*** 
(0.00) 
Log Assets  -0.156*** 
(0.00) 
Constant  -0.875*** 
(0.00) 
SEC Chairman Dummies  Yes 
U.S. President Dummies  Yes 
Industry Dummies  No 
Year Dummies  Yes 
Observations  92,690 
Pseudo R-squared  0.078 
Notes to Table 7, Panel A:  
a The dependent variable for the model presented here is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm’s labor intensity is in the top 
decile of labor intensity, and zero otherwise for the period 1982–2012. The results reported are from a Probit regression estimation and are 
used to calculate the propensity scores. P-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimate. *, **, *** represent 
signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed), respectively; variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. See Table 1 for 
variable definitions.   
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Panel B: Test of Matching
b 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables 
Mean top decile labor 
intensity firms 
Mean matched non-top decile labor 
intensity firms 
Mean Difference  
(1) – (2)  
           
F-score 1  1.161  1.149  0.012 
(0.32) 
Proximate 100  0.333  0.333  0.000 
(0.96) 
PAC Contribution  10.661  10.974  -0.313 
     (0.57) 
Union 0.102  0.101 0.001 
     (0.59) 
Log Analyst Following  0.789  0.774  0.015 
     (0.26) 
Fortune 500  0.040  0.036  0.004 
     (0.13) 
ROA -0.032  -0.029  -0.003 
(0.20) 
Big 4  0.765  0.759  0.006 
(0.32) 
Market-to-Book 2.749  2.680  0.069 
(0.28) 
Leverage 0.165  0.162  0.003 
(0.38) 
Log Firm Age  2.362  2.347  0.015 
(0.18) 
Log Assets  3.992  3.985  0.007 
(0.79) 
Notes to Table 7, Panel B:  
b Panel B reports the average values of the variables used in my matching procedure after matching and the average difference in these 
variables of top decile labor intensive firms and the matched non-top decile labor intensive firms. Propensity scores for matching are 
obtained from the probit model in Panel A. Each top decile labor intensive firm observation is matched to a non-top decile labor intensive 
firm observation within the same year and SEC Chairman years, using propensity score estimation, without replacement. I apply the nearest 
neighbor matching estimator. P-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimate. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed), respectively. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Average Treatment Effect
c 
 
      (1)    (2) (3) 
Variable Sample  N  Mean top decile labor 
intensity firms  N  Mean matched non-top 
decile labor intensity firms 
Mean 
Difference (1) – 
(2) 
AAER 
Dummy  Matched 9,550  0.003  9,550  0.007  -0.004*** 
Notes to Table 7, Panel C:  
c Panel C reports the average treatment effect of labor intensity on being subject to an AAER. P-values are displayed in parentheses below 
the coefﬁcient estimate. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed), respectively. See Table 1 for variable 
definitions.   
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Panel D: Logistic Regression Estimation on the Matched Sample of the Probability of 
being subject to an AAER in Election Years and Majority Years
d 
 
    
Variables  AAER Dummy  AAER Dummy 
       
Top Decile Labor Intensity   -0.528**  -0.669*** 
(0.02) (0.01) 
Election Year  -0.093   
(0.75)  
Top Decile Labor Intensity * Election Year  -1.164*   
(0.08)  
Senior Congressman    -0.121 
   (0.66) 
Top Decile Labor Intensity * Senior Congressman     -0.646 
   (0.25) 
Constant -4.982***  -4.910*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
SEC Chairman Dummies  No  No 
U.S. President Dummies  No  No 
Industry Dummies  No   No 
Year Dummies  No  No 
Observations 19,100  18,959 
Pseudo R-squared  0.014  0.015 
Notes to Table 7, Panel D:  
a The dependent variable for all the models presented here is an indicator variable that is equal to one in the years a firm has been subject to 
an AAER for allegedly misstating its financial statements, and zero otherwise for the period 1982–2012. The results reported are from a 
logistic regression estimation on my matched sample of top decile labor intensity and non-top decile labor intensity firms. P-values are 
displayed in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimate. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed), 
respectively; variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   
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Table 8: Tobit and logistic regression estimation of the number of comment letters and 
the probability of receiving a comment letter
a 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables Number  Comment  Letters 
Number Comment 
Letters  Comment Letter Dummy 
Comment Letter 
Dummy 
            
Labor Intensity  -5.919*  -5.919*  -2.324*  -2.324* 
(0.06) (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
F-score 1  0.295***  0.295***  0.104***  0.104*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Proximate 100  -0.183**  -0.183**  -0.084**  -0.084** 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Pac Contribution  0.001    0.001   
 (0.75)   (0.37)   
Lobbying Exp  0.001***  0.001*** 
(0.01) (0.00) 
Union -0.022**  -0.022**  -0.008  -0.008* 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Log Analyst Following  -0.043  -0.043  -0.012  -0.012 
 (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.62)  (0.62) 
Fortune 500  0.596***  0.596***  0.253***  0.253*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
ROA -2.121***  -2.121***  -0.880***  -0.880*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Big 4  -0.728***  -0.728***  -0.290***  -0.290*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Market-to-Book 0.022***  0.022***  0.011***  0.011*** 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 0.592***  0.592***  0.259***  0.259*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Log Firm Age  0.177***  0.177***  0.067***  0.067*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Log Assets  0.375***  0.375***  0.156***  0.156*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant -5.944***  -5.944***  -2.417***  -2.417*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
  
SEC Chairman Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Clustered by  Firm  Firm  Firm  Firm 
Observations 20,768  20,768  20,768  20,768 
Pseudo R-squared  0.067  0.067  0.127  0.127 
Notes to Table 8:  
a The dependent variable for model 1 and 2 is the number of comment letters a firm has either received or sent to the SEC, and for model 3 
and 4 an indicator variable that is equal to one in the years a firm has received a comment letter to the SEC, and zero otherwise. As data on 
comment letters is only publicly available from 2004 onwards, these models are limited to the period 2004-2010. The results of model 1 and 
2 are from a Tobit regression estimation; and for model 3 and 4 from a logistic regression estimation. While model 1 and 3 include a firm’s 
PAC contributions, model 2 and 4 include a firm’s lobbying expenditures. P-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefﬁcient 
estimate. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed), respectively; variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99% levels. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   